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In industrial nations a large number of patents have been granted on inventions 
which  wholly  or  partly  are  based  on  computer  software.  Particularly in  the 
United states of America this granting practise extends to patents on methods of 
doing business which have been implemented to software. At the same time 
growing  resentment  particularly  of  small  and  medium  enterprises  and  free 
software developers can be observed. Notwithstanding these general conflicts of 
interests most industrial nations did not yet address the issue by legislation but 
left it to the courts to find solutions.
The Green Paper on Electronic Commerce for South Africa, issued in 2000 by 
the Department of Communications suggests that the scope of definition and the 
criterion in rendering a patent had to be widened with emphasis on protection, 
monitoring and enforcement measures to synchronize South African patent law 
with  a  global  integrated  mechanism  for  the  administration  and  issuing  of 
patents.1
This  paper  examines  whether  the  granting of  patents  to  software is  just  the 
consequent application of traditional patent law to a modern form of inventions 
or constitutes  a  substantial  change of the patent  law which,  in  a democratic 
society, should only be done by a parliamentary act of legislation. The paper 
provides a discerning look at the genesis of software patents in the case laws of 
the United States of America and the European Union, paying attention to the 
technological facts of the cases and the legal reasoning.
B. Definitions
The term “software patent” itself is a delicate one; those who are in favour of a 
broad patentability of software therefore try to avoid it rather speaking about 
“computer-related-inventions”  or  “computer-implemented-inventions”,  e.g.  In 
the “United States Patents and Trademarks Office Manual of Patent Examining 
Practice”  of  1996  or  the  proposed  “Directive  on  Computer  Implemented 
Inventions” of the European Commission2.
Especially in Europe the term gives rise to disputes. The supporters of a more 
permissive patent law in respect to software products appreciate the statement 
that they are not demanding the patentability of software as such3 but patent 
rights  in  industrial  methods  that  make  use  of  computers  and  therefore  not 
“software patents”.  The objectors however suspect logomachy and politically 
motivated obfuscation in this terminology. They fear that patentability of mere 
software, thus “software patents”, will be the very outcome of any opening of 
the patent  law to software products  in  any manner  whatsoever,  unless  strict 
1 Green Paper on Electronic Commerce for South Africa, sec. 6.6
2 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the patentability 
of computer-implemented inventions (COM/2002/0092 final - COD 2002/0047) OJ C 151 E 
, 25/06/2002 P. 0129 – 0131 = 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/comp/com02-92en.pdf
3 The term “as such” is problematic in this context and will be discussed later
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limitations accompany them. Accordingly they speak about “software patents”.
In  fact  a  patent  for  an  invention  that  makes  use  of  a  computer  does  not 
necessarily need  to  be  a  “software  patent”.  But  from which  angle  ever  one 
approaches the matter and however one calls it, two terms will unerringly be 
encountered:  “software”  and  “patent”.  Hence  those  two  must  be  defined 
separately in order to achieve any perceptions upon the legal relation between 
them and related issues. 
I. Software
“Software”  can  be  understood  as  the  general  term  for  information  that  is 
recorded onto some kind of medium. The medium that stores software - e.g. a 
CD-ROM,  a  hard-drive,  a  piece  of  paper,  etc.  -  is  not  software.  However 
“computer  software”  usually  refers  to  “computer  programs”  and  computer 
related patents that do not merely claim on invented hardware, normally claim 
on the used computer program. Hence the meaning of “computer program” as a 
sub category of “software” is the pivotal element to define here.
A  computer  program prescribes  the  actions  ("computations")  that  are  to  be 
carried  out  by  a  computer.  Most  programs  consist  of  a  loadable  set  of 
instructions which determines how the computer will react to user input when 
that program is running, i.e. when the instructions are loaded.4
Basically  computer  programs  appear  in  two  different  forms.  The  so  called 
source  code  allegorises  the  program  in  a  human  readable  programming 
language,  e.g.  “Fortran”,  “Basic”,  “Pascal”,  “C”,  “Java”.  Such programming 
languages feature a vocabulary that  allows the programmer to express steps, 
procedures and logical relations in a manner which is comprehensible to the 
human way of thinking. They can be understood as a mathematical language 
that expresses mathematics in words. Writing a computer program that performs 
a certain predetermined mathematical algorithm is rather an act of translation 
than of  creation.  Digital  Processors  however  do not  “think”  like the human 
brain.  They only may interpret  binary code,  numbers that  merely consists  of 
zeros and ones. Hence in order to be executed by a digital processor, a program 
must be further transformed from source form into a binary form, the so called 
“binary-file” or “executable”.  This is  done by a “compiler”,  which creates a 
permanent executable or an “interpreter” which transforms source code step by 
step, i.e. instruction by instruction, into temporary binary code that normally is 
just kept in the volatile storage of the computer.
The program – in binary form – instructs the processor (or more precisely: the 
“arithmetic and logical unit”) of a computer to perform elementary operations 
such  as  arithmetic  operations  (addition,  subtraction,  etc.),  logical  operations 
(AND,  OR,  NOT),  and  comparison  operations  (for  example,  comparing  the 
contents of two bytes for equality).5 Every complex operation of a computer can 
4 Wikipedia “computer program”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_programs <30. May 
2005>
5 Wikipedia “computer ”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer <30. May 2005>
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be analysed into a plurality of such elementary arithmetic or logical operations.
Hence a computer program consists of nothing else than arithmetic or logical 
instructions,  notwithstanding  how  'inarithmetic'  or  'illogic'  the  processed 
information may seem to be. In this regard the famous "Church-Turing thesis"6 
shall be mentioned, but due to it's mathematical complexity not discussed.
II. Patent
The word “patent”  is  derived from the Latin “literae patentes” which means 
open letters. A patent can be understood as an exchange between the inventor 
and the public.  The inventor  discloses  the invention in  some detail  so as to 
enable one of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains to create 
and make use of the invention. In return the inventor obtains the exclusive right 
to prevent others from making use of the invention for a certain period (usually 
20 years). This means a monopoly on making, using, offering for sale, or selling 
the invention.7 The monopoly does not only comprize a particular form of using 
the invention but  the method or Funktionsweise as such. However the inventor 
may sell licenses to other to participate in his right.
The  purpose  of  patents  are  to  encourage  research  and  development  of  new 
technologies by securing the fruits of an invention to the inventor (for the given 
period). Patents may not be mixed up with copyrights, which grant exclusive 
rights  on  the  use  of  a  particular  form,  way or  manner  in  which  an idea  or 
information is expressed and presented. That software is protected by copyright 
is beyond doubt.
III. Invention
“Invention”  is  a  term  that  shall  and  can  not be  defined  here,  because  it's 
definition is part of the issue this paper is concerned with. However it must be 
clarified  that  the  term  “invention”  whenever  used  in  this  paper  does  not 
necessarily mean “technological invention” or “patentable invention”. It merely 
means some result of any inventive work which can also be something clearly 
non-patentable such as tricky riddle or an enthralling murder mystery.
IV. Technical
In this paper the term “technical” is solely used in it's meaning as a byword for 
“technological” and not “professional”.
6 Church, A set of Postulates for the Foundation of Logic, Annals of Mathematics, second 
series, 33, pp. 346-366; Turing, On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the 
Entscheidungsproblem, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, Series 2, 42 
(1936-37), pp. 230-265 
7 Chisum et al., Principles of Patent Law, p. 2
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C. The genesis of software patents
About four decades ago the question arose whether and to what extend patents 
may be  legally  issued  for  inventions  that  implement  software  or  are  based 
completely upon it. Since then it has been answered more and more discordant 
by jurisdictions of different industrial nations.
I. United States Of America
1. The Statutes
In the U.S.A. patents may be granted under 35 U.S.C. § 101 which provides:
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,  
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and  useful  improvement  thereof,  may  obtain  a  patent  
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”
The following § 102 provides for the additional requirement of “novelty” which 
means, that the invention must not been known, used or described in a printed 
publication by others before.
§ 103 limits the subject matter under § 101 to inventions that are non-obvious 
“at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
to which said subject matter pertains”. Moreover it says that “patentability shall 
not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made”, 35 U.S.C. § 
103 (a).
The title is accompanied by some other conditions and requirements, none of 
which include an  expressis verbis exclusion for software. In the 1960s, a law 
commission formed by President Johnson, recommended to amend the statutes 
by such an exclusion,8 This amendment has never been made, but in 1968 the 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued examination guidelines that do 
not consider computer programs  as patentable subject matter.9
In the course of the developments this  paper investigates,  new „Examination 
Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions“10 have been issued by the USPTO.
8 President's Commission on the patent system, To promote the progress of useful arts in an 
age of exploding technology S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 20-21  [1966]
9 Examination of Patent Applications on Computer Programs, 33 Fed. Reg. 15,609-10 (1968), 
rescinded by 34 Fed. Reg. 15,724 [1969]
10 Patent and Trademark Office United States Department of Commerce, „Examination 
Guidelines for Computer-Related Invention“ Final Version, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/pdf/ciig.pdf <8 July 2005> (USPTO Guidelines)
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2. Application process and remedies
Patent applications must be filed to the PTO not later than one year after
• public use of the invention; 
• the placing on the market of the invention for sale in the United States; or 
• the publication of a description of the invention anywhere in the world.
They have to disclose details of the invention, including trade secrets.
If the PTO examiner rejects an application, the claimant may appeal to the PTO 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. If the examiner grants a patent, it can 
be challenged by a third party in a lawsuit filed in a United States District Court. 
A decision from those courts may be appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and prior to 1982 accordingly to its predecessor 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA). Their decisions can – under 
certain circumstances – be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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Figure 1: Stages of Appeal
3. Caselaw
a. The “Supreme Court Trilogy”
In the 1970s the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide about three patent claims 
that involved the use of computer software. This “Supreme Court Trilogy”11 lay 
down a set of rules how to determine the patentability of a computer software.
(1.) Gottschalk v Benson 
The first was  Gottschalk v Benson12 which involved the attempt to patent “a 
method of programming a general purpose digital computer to convert signals 
from binary coded decimal form13 into pure binary form14”. This was achieved 
by an mathematical algorithm that has been implemented into a software. The 
algorithm could have been executed by existing computers,  no specific  new 
machinery being necessary.  The Supreme Court described an algorithm as “a 
procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem”.15
The court  pointed  out,  that  the  relation  between decimal  numbers  and  their 
binary representatives follow a mathematical rule, the application of which can 
also be performed mentally without use of a computer.16 With a little logical 
understanding this rule can be derived from the table to the right:
Our common numeric system is based on 
ten  digits:  “0”  to  “9”.  The  value 
represented by each symbol depends on the 
value of the digit and it's position, i.e. the 
place.   When  we  count  up,  we  start  to 
count  from “0”  to  “9”  in  the  last  place. 
After  the  last  place  has  reached  “9”  we 
increase the second last place by one value, 
thus from “0” to “1”, and switch back the 
last  place  to  “0”.  Hence  the  number 
following  “9”  (or  “09”)  is  “10”.  Then 
again we count up to “9” in the last place 
(or to “19” in respect to both places), again 
followed  by  the  step  of  increasing  the 
second last place by one value from “1” to 
“2” and switching the  last  place back  to 
“0”. So the number after “19” is “20”. This 
sequence will be repeated till “99”, after which both, the last and the second last 
place switch to “0” while the third last place is increased by one. Using this 
system, we can express an unlimited array of numbers by just ten symbols.
The binary numeric system works similar, but on the basis of two symbols: “0” 
and “1”. Hence whenever a place reaches “1”, the next place will be increased 
11 As named e.g. in State Street v Signature, 927 F.Supp. 502 (@508) [1996]
12 Gottschalk v Benson, 409 U.S. 63 [1972]
13 Numbers in a mathematical system with the base 10
14 Numbers in a mathematical system with the base 2
15 Gottschalk v Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (@65) [1972]



















by one, which soon results into very long numbers – the year 2005 expressed as 
a binary number is the year 11111010101 – and therefore not easy to be handled 
by the human brain. However computers always “think” in binary code, because 
the electric status in a computer’s transistor can only express two values: “no 
electric current” (for “0”) and “electric current”  (for “1”).  Since a computer 
contains billions  of transistors, it  can store and handle so complex data. But 
actually everything is encoded in binary numbers. Therefore the conversion of 
decimal numbers to binary numbers is not only a trivial mathematical law, but 
also a vital element of any digital computer.
In binary encoded decimal numbers each symbol (place) of a decimal number is 
replaced in  separate  blocks  by the four  digit  binary correspondent  (compare 
figure 1 again). Thus “53” equals - expressed as binary encoded decimal number 
-  to “0101  0011”.
The conversion of binary encoded decimal numbers to pure decimal numbers 
consists  of no more than applying the above explained mathematic rule  two 
times successively, first  in respect  to each four digit  segment of the  binary 
encoded  decimal  numbers,  then  (in  the  'other  direction')  in  respect  to  the 
resulting decimal numbers.
The Supreme Court stated that in accordance to precedents, a scientific truth, or 
the mathematical expression of it, was not a patentable invention, a novel and 
useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.17 
A principle in the abstract was a fundamental truth, an original cause, a motive; 
and these could not be patented, as no one could claim in either of them an 
exclusive right.18 Moreover the court quoted Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard: 
“An idea of itself is not patentable.”19
Supreme Court  held in  Benson that  the process claimed is no more than the 
mere  expression  of  a  mathematical  truth,  too  abstract  and  sweeping  to  be 
patented.20 The scope of possible end use may vary from the operation of a train 
to verification of drivers’ licenses to researching the law books for precedents. 
A reference  to  O'Reilly  v  Morse21 has  been  made,  where  the  court  rejected 
Samuel Morse's broad claim covering any use of electromagnetism for printing 
intelligible signs, characters or letters at a distance.
Hence this software was held non-statutory subject matter. The court pointed 
out, that there is a lack of certainty in connection with software and patent law 
that  should be addressed by the U.S.  Congress.22 By some the decision  was 
already accepted as a “final” determination that computer programs were not 
patentable.23 However the Supreme Court expressly stated that the decision did 
not preclude any computer program from patenability.24 The question where to 
draw the line between a patentable and an non-patentable computer program 
17 MacKay Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86 (@94)
18 LeRoy v. Tatham,14 How. 156 (@175)
19 Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498 (@507)
20 Gottschalk v Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (@68) [1972]
21 O'Reilly v. Morse 15 How. 62
22 Gottschalk v Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (@73) [1972]
23 Goldman, Ed. The Oyez Project, Oyez: Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
24 Gottschalk v Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (@71) [1972]
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was not answered yet.25
(2.) Parker v Flook
The  second  decision  in  the  trilogy  was  in  the  case  Parker  v  Flook.26 An 
individual (Flook) applied for a patent on a method for updating alarm limits 
during catalytic conversion processes,  the only novel feature of which was a 
mathematical formula. The patent claim covered a broad range of potential uses, 
but  not  every  conceivable  application  of  the  formula.  The  PTO  examiner's 
rejection of the application as “not eligible for patent protection” was sustained 
by the Board of Appeals of the PTO, but reversed by the Court of Customs and 
Patent  Appeals  (CCPA).27 The  US  Supreme  Court  however  held  Flook's 
invention to be non statutory subject matter.
Abiding by their basic rule of Gottschalk v Benson that a mathematic formula is 
not  patentable,28 the  Supreme  Court  now  had  to  decide  whether  the 
identification  of  a  limited  category  of  useful  conventional  post  solution 
applications of such formula makes it eligible for a patent. 
During  a  catalytic  conversion  process  certain  operating  conditions  such  as 
temperature, pressure and flow rates have to be constantly monitored. When any 
of these values exceed a predetermined alarm limit  an abnormal  situation is 
indicated that may require certain arrangements by the operator of the machine. 
During transient operating situations - such as start up – it might be necessary to 
update alarm limits periodically. Flook's patent application described a method 
of updating alarm limits. This method did not differ from prior art alarm limit 
updating except for the mathematic algorithm that was used to calculate the new 
alarm limits.29
The court  pointed out that a process was not  unpatentable simply because it 
contains a mathematical algorithm. But the algorithm itself may not be the only 
inventive step in it. A mere scientific principle was not subject of a patent, since 
it  just  revealed  a  relationship  that  had  always  existed.  The  court  drew  a 
comparison to Newton's formulation of the law of universal gravitation, which 
had  always  been  existing  even  before  Newton  announced  it.  Such  “mere 
recognition  of  a  therefore  existing  phenomenon  carries  with  it  no  rights  to 
exclude others from its enjoyment”.30
With  the notion  that  the algorithm itself  cannot  constitute  a novel  invention 
since it has been existing ever since, only a new way – in terms of 35 U.S.C. § 
102 – of applying it in order to estimate new alarm limits may justify a patent 
claim. Flook's invention however lacked of any novelty beside the algorithm. 
Hence it was held nonstatutory subject matter. Again the court emphasized that 
any  change  of  that  understanding  of  the  law  could  only  be  made  by  the 
Congress.31 
25 Hollaar, Legal Protection of Digital Information, p. 299
26 Parker v Flook 437 U.S. 584 [1978]
27 In Re Flook 559 F.2d 21 [1977]
28 Parker v Flook 437 U.S. 584 (@585) [1978]
29 Parker v Flook 437 U.S. 584 (@587) [1978]
30 Parker v Flook 437 U.S. 584 (@592) [1978]
31 Parker v Flook 437 U.S. 584 (@595) [1978]
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(3.) Diamond v Diehr
The final instalment in the trilogy was Diamond v Diehr32 of 1981; the subject 
was a process for curing synthetic rubber employing a computer. The software 
on the computer performed a well known mathematical algorithm to determine 
the proper time for the rubber to cure. 
A perfect  cure for  moulded rubber  depends on several  factors  including the 
thickness of the raw material, the temperature of the moulding process and the 
amount of time that the raw article is  allowed to remain in the press. These 
values can be estimated by making use of the Arrhenius equation, which was 
well  known  before.  Even  the  application  of  the  Arrhenius  equation  to  the 
process of moulding rubber was prior known. New however were the means for 
measuring the temperature in the press and for using that information to open 
the press automatically in the exact moment when the rubber is cured properly. 
Prior to the invention moulding times could only be estimated roughly due to 
uncontrollable variables such as the decrease of temperature during opening of 
the  press.  Diehr  developed  a  method  that  constantly  measures  the  precise 
temperature  in  the  closed  press  by  using  a  thermocouple  and  feeds  this 
information  into  a  computer  which  repeatedly  recalculates  the  curing  time. 
When the calculated curing time is elapsed the computer generates a signal that 
causes the press to open automatically.
U.S.  Supreme Court  held this  invention to be statutory subject matter  of 35 
U.S.C.  § 101  hence  patentable.  Diehr's  claims  were  not  directed  to  a 
mathematical algorithm or an improved method of calculation but rather recited 
an improved process for moulding rubber articles by solving a practical problem 
related to it.33 
While the majority of United States jurists considers this decision to be a shift in 
view of the Supreme Court and a turn towards patentability of software34, the 
author opines that it is perfectly in line with the rest of the 'trilogy'. The Supreme 
Court expressly abide by their prior arguing that a mathematical method is not 
subject to a patent. At the same time a process that otherwise is statutory does 
not become non-statutory simply because the use of a computer is incorporated. 
The  court  pointed  out,  that  it  is  aware  of  the  the  Committee  Reports 
accompanying  the  1952  Act  which  stated  that  Congress  intended  statutory 
subject  matter  to  “include  anything  under  the  sun  that  is  made  by man.”35 
However that did not alter the fact that laws of nature, physical phenomena and 
abstract ideas are excluded from this Act.36 The underlying notion is that these 
are not  made,  at  least  not  by man. A process or improvement  that  does not 
include particular machines acquired patentability if it transformed or reduced 
an article “to a different state or thing”.37 Diehr's invention did so. The actual 
inventive  step  did  not  reside  in  the  software,  but  in  the  measurement  of 
32 Diamond v Diehr 450 U.S. 175 [1981]
33 Diamond v Diehr 450 U.S. 175 (@181) [1981]
34 Chisum et alia, Principles of Patent Law, p. 730
35 See S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952), H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., Sec. 
2d Sess., 6 (1952) 
36 Diamond v Diehr 450 U.S. 175 (@185) [1981]
37 Diamond v Diehr 450 U.S. 175 (@183) [1981]
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temperatures in a closed moulding press and in the process of improved rubber 
moulding as a whole. In other words: in the retrieval of information that will be 
processed  by  the  software  and  the  tangible  application  of  it's  result.  The 
algorithm implemented in the computer software forms a part of that invention. 
But the algorithm as such still would not be patentable, nor does the patent for 
the rubber moulding process grant rights in the algorithm as such.
While  the decision demines that  a computer program as part  of an statutory 
process that changes a physical structure is clearly statutory, it still lacks of a 
tangible  definition  of  the  borderline  to  non-statutory  implementations  of 
computer  programs.  In  particular  the  question  arose  whether  the  same  rule 
applies  if  the  computer  program is  implemented  in  a  process  that  does  not 
physically change matter.38
b. The Freeman-Walter-Abele-Test
In all three cases of the “trilogy” the court of lower instance – the U.S. Court of 
Customs and Patent  Appeals  (CCPA) –  reversed  the  rejection  of  the  PTO's 
examiner, resp. the sustaining decision of the Board of Appeals of the PTO. The 
CCPA  always  rather  tended  to  grant  patents  on  software  or  mathematic 
algorithms, where that time the PTO and their Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences tended to reject them.
After  Gottschalk v Benson39 and  Parker v Flook.40 however the CCPA had to 
imply the  U.S.  Supreme Court's  opinion  that  mere  mathematical  algorithms 
(even  when  translated  to  computer  programs)  remain  non-statutory  subject 
matter  into  their  own  adjudication.  Since  the  CCPA  struggled  with  that 
implication,  it  articulated  it's  own  method  of  examining  algorithm  related 
inventions, which became known as the “Freeman-Walter-Abele-Test”.41
(1.) In Re Freeman
The PTO's examiner and the  Board of Appeals of the PTO rejected Freeman's 
invention  of  a  system  for  typesetting  alphanumeric  information,  especially 
mathematical formulas, using a computer based control system in conjunction 
with  a  conventional  phototypesetter.  Upon  Freeman's  appeal,  the  CCPA 
reversed their decisions.42
The patent claim comprised a system consisting of  input-, computing-, storage- 
and output device, which virtually is  the arrangement of any data processing 
system. The actual invention resided in the method of arranging the stored data 
and processing it in a way that provide the output device with orders for the 
exact positioning of symbols. This was done by a computer program running on 
38 Hollaar, Legal Protection of Digital Information, p. 309
39 Gottschalk v Benson, 409 U.S. 63 [1972]
40 Parker v Flook 437 U.S. 584 [1978]
41 Saladi, Computer Software: Patentable Subject Matter Jurisprudence Comes Of Age, 
      18 JMARJCIL 113
42 In Re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237; 197 USPQ 464 [1978]
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the computing device of the system.
The stored data was arranged in a hierarchical tree structure of datasets, each of 
which consisted of one symbol, whether a character or an operator. The tree 
structure defined the exact position of each symbol by starting a new “branch” 
for each symbol that begins a new line, above, on or below the main line of the 
formula. The “local positioning algorithm” converted the (tree-) structured data 
into exact orders for the output device to position the symbols in accordance 
with  their  appearance,  while  maintaining  the  mathematical  integrity  of  the 
expression.
The  CCPA  rejected  a  holding  that  patent  claims  had  to  be  dissected  into 
components, which separately must be examined for being in the prior art, and if 
the  only novel  component  is  outside  the  statutory classes  of  inventions,  the 
claim  needed  to  be  rejected  (the  so  called  “point  of  novelty  approach”). 
Moreover  the  court  emphasized  that  they  do  not  understand  Gottschalk  v 
Benson43 as an exclusion of computer programs from patentability.44
Instead  it  developed  a  “two-step  analysis”  to  determine  whether  a  claim  is 
statutory subject matter in the light of Gottschalk v Benson:
1. “It must  be determined whether the claim directly or indirectly recites an 
algorithm in the Benson sense of that term.”
2. “The  claim  must  be  further  analysed  to  ascertain  whether  in  it's  entirety 
wholly preempts that algorithm.”45
The actual difficulty the court allocated in the question what an “algorithm” is in 
the “Benson sense of  that  term”.  Two definitions  where discussed.  A broad 
definition  by  the  Webster's  New  Collegiate  Dictionary,  stating  that  “an 
algorithm is a step-by-step procedure for solving a problem or accomplishing 
some  end”  was  refused  as  inappropriate  since  almost  any  process  can 
characterized  as  a  step-by-step  procedure,  while  a  “process”  is  expressed 
statutory subject matter of  35 U.S.C. § 101. Preference was given to a narrow 
definition  of  algorithm as  being  the  “procedure  for  solving  a  given  type of 
mathematical problem”.
In analysing whether the claim recites an algorithm it did not necessarily have 
be  searched  for  algebraic  formulas  expressed  in  traditional  mathematical 
symbols. Also prose could express a mathematical algorithm. At the same time 
the usage of the word “algorithm” in the claim was not necessarily referring to a 
mathematical algorithm, thus an algorithm “in the Benson sense”.
In  Freeman's  typesetting  system  the  court  did  not  find  any  mathematical 
algorithm “in the  Benson sense”. The “local positioning algorithm” in the the 
patent claim referred to the broad definition of algorithm as any step-by-step 
procedure and did not recite process steps which are themselves mathematical 
calculations,  formulas  or  equations.   Hence  the  court  did  not  even  have  to 
perform the second step, since no “algorithm in the Benson sense”  was recited.
The CCPA did not at all discuss or even recognised the fact that any computer 
43 Gottschalk v Benson, 409 U.S. 63 [1972]
44 In Re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (@1244) [1981]
45 In Re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (@1245) [1981]
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program is a multiplicity of mathematical operations.46 One of the first judicially 
approved software patents was born.
(2.) In Re Walter
After  Parker  v Flook47 the CCPA had to  amend their  “Freeman-Test”  In re  
Walter48 where  the  appellant  claimed  a  patent  on  a  “Seismic  Prospecting 
System”.
Seismic surveying and prospecting is done by sending seismic source waves into 
earth and monitoring the deflection of the signal by subsurface features. The 
waves are created by a mechanical apparatus which vibrate against the surface 
of  earth. The returning signals are monitored by so called “geophones” which 
are set out on the surface. This method was in the prior art.
Since  the  returning  signals  have  been  deflected  from  different  depth  and 
locations,  they are  a  jumble  of  different  frequency components.  In  order  to 
evaluate  the  recordings  of  the geophones,  the frequency jumble needs  to  be 
broken  down  into  it's  components  and  it's  individual  deflected  portions 
identified.
Walter's  invention  did  so  by  converting  the  recordings  into  digital  form, 
dividing it into segments and cross-correlating it with the original transmission 
signal. A computer performed several mathematical operations on it, including 
the  “Cooley-Tukey-Algorithm”49,  which  is  a  so  called  “Fast  Fourier 
Transform”,50 known since around 1805 when it was utilized by Carl Friedrich 
Gauss.
The  patent  claim  restated  the  mathematical  algorithms  that  were  used  in  a 
mathematical language using symbols such as variables, numbers and operators.
The  CCPA rejected  an understanding of  Parker  v  Flook51 that  it  adopts  the 
“point of novelty approach”52. Instead it restated the second step of the Freeman-
Test: 
“Once a mathematical algorithm has been found, the claim as a whole must be 
further analysed. If it appears that the mathematical algorithm is implemented in 
a  specific  manner  to  define  structural  relationships  between  the  physical 
elements of the claim (in apparatus claims) or to refine or limit claim steps (in 
process claims), the claim being otherwise statutory, the claim passes muster 
under  35  U.S.C.  §101.  If,  however,  the  mathematical  algorithm  is  merely 
presented and solved by the claimed invention, as was the case in Benson and 
Flook, and is not applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps, 
46 See above the definition of software
47 Parker v Flook 437 U.S. 584 [1978]
48 In Re Walter, 618 F.2d 758; 205 USPQ 397 [1980]
49 Wikipedia “Cooley-Tukey”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cooley-Tukey_FFT_algorithm <30. 
May 2005>
50 Wikipedia “fast Fourier transform”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fast_Fourier_transform 
<30. May 2005>
51 Parker v Flook 437 U.S. 584 [1978]
52 See above
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no amount  of post-solution activity will  render the claim statutory; nor  is  it 
saved  by  a  preamble  merely  reciting  the  field  of  use  of  the  mathematical 
algorithm.”
One indication for  a mere preemption of  a  mathematical  algorithm – in  the 
opinion of the court – are an end product, that is no more than a pure number.53 
The mere recording of such a result on, e.g. a magnetic tape, does not render the 
claim statutory. The fact that an blank tape is physically different from a tape 
containing the results is not an adequate relation between algorithm and physical 
elements in terms of the new “Freeman-Walter-Test”.54 The underlying notion 
of  course  is,  that  the  recorded  information  is  not  necessarily bound  to  that 
specific tape but could be stored on any device, including a piece of paper or 
even someone's mind.
Applying these rules, the CCPA came in this case to the same result as the PTO 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences:
Walter's invention was no more then an improved method of calculating. The 
method  described  an  mathematical  exercise,  which  remains  a  mathematical 
exercise even when verbally tied to the specific end use of seismic prospection. 
The invention did not improve the apparatus of seismic prospection but merely 
the method of interpreting their results. Even the possibility of substituting the 
multi purpose computer running a software with an electronic hardware that has 
only and dedicatedly been designed to perform the algorithm for the specific 
purpose did not render the invention statutory, as the CCPA pointed out with a 
reference to their own case law.55
The even more interesting aspect of the decision is, that the CCPA for the first 
time  addressed  the  fact  that  any  computer  program  is  a  multiplicity  of 
mathematical  operations,  after  the  PTO  Board  based  their  rejection  partly 
thereupon.
The CCPA hold that accepting the notion that computers work mathematically 
would suffice to  remove all  computer  arts  inventions  from the scope on 35 
U.S.C. §101. The court substantiated their opinion by a couple of examples: any 
invention that makes use of gravity would be non-statutory because gravity “is 
expressible as a mathematical formula”, any invention that comprised a timed 
process would be non-statutory because “time is counted in minutes”.56
The  court  ignored  three  facts  in  this  obiter  dictum:  First  the  notion  that 
computers work mathematically is not subject to someone's acceptance, it is a 
fact. Second the eventuality that gravity can be expressed as a mathematical 
formula does  not  render  falling things  to  be something mathematical,  nor  is 
mere  counting something mathematical.  Third the notion that computer work 
mathematically  does  not  exempt  any  computer  related  invention  from 
patentability.  The  question  what  a  computer  program  needs  to  perform  – 
additionally to solely causing (mathematical) computations in the computer – is 
the very problem that  was  addressed by the Supreme Court.  The “Freeman-
53 In Re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (@768)
54 In Re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (@770)
55 In Re Gelnovatch, 602 F.2d 982; 203 USPQ 44 [1979]
56 In Re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (@769)
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Walter-Test”, requesting a relation between mathematics and physical elements 
or procedures,  seemed to be a very useful approach, while it remained unclear 
what the court meant by “or to refine or limit claim steps”. A presumption that 
computers  are  nothing  mathematical  however  was  neither  necessary  nor 
appropriate in that respect.
(3.) In Re Abele
In Re Abele57 the invention was a method for image processing,  particularly 
applied to computerized axial tomography or CAT scans.
Conventional computerised tomography was able to provide a visualized cross-
section transverse to the body axis even prior to Abele's invention. However the 
conventional method required the examined object to be exposed to X-rays for a 
relative long time. The invention of the appellant was a software based method 
to process the image provided by the tomograph, which helped to reduce the 
time, the object (human body) was required to remain in the tomograph  as well 
as to eliminate artifacts in the image by using a  “ weighting function”,  thus 
improving the quality of the image.
The method of tomography as such was not different to the prior art, but the 
mathematical method of computer aided processing of the image was.
The  PTO Board  of  Appeals  applied  the  “Freeman-Walter-Test” and,  in  the 
second step,  did not  find the algorithm “implemented in a manner to  define 
structural relationships to physical elements in the apparatus claims or to refine 
or limit claim steps in the process claims”.58
The patent application comprised claims that are solemnly related to the method 
of image processing, as well as claims that directed that same method to the use 
in  connexion  with  a  tomography device.  In  respect  to  the  latter,  the  CCPA 
reversed the PTO Board’s decision upon Abele's appeal. The court pointed out, 
that the PTO Board did not apply their  “Freeman-Walter-Test” in the proper 
way and now clarified the condition “...to refine or limit claim steps” which if 
given, drew an algorithm implemented invention statutory subject matter:
The claim needs to show an application of the algorithm to process steps which 
are themselves part of an overall process which is statutory.
The court held the overall improved process of tomography to be statutory and 
drew a direct compare to the improved molding process in Diamond v Diehr59.
In fact  there was a difference between Diehr's and Abele's inventions:  Diehr 
created a new physical device, equipped with new physical means for measuring 
the  temperature  in  the  closed  molding  press  and  new  physical  means  for 
controlling the molding process in accordance with the results of the computer's 
calculations. Whereas Abele's invention merely processed the data that has been 
produced by a conventional tomograph. It is to grant to the CCPA's opinion, that 
Abele's invention enabled users of it to use the tomograph in a different way, i.e. 
57 In Re Abele, 684 F.2d 902; 214 USPQ 682 [1982]
58 In Re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (@905) 
59 Diamond v Diehr 450 U.S. 175 [1981]
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in a way that exposes the object for a shorter period of time to hazardous X-rays. 
In Re Abele certainly is one of the most difficult borderline cases, but the direct 
compare to Diamond v Diehr is very arguable since – different to Diehr – Abele 
did not  create  a  new physical  technology which made use of  the algorithm. 
Notable  is  that  the  CCPA  expressly  deems  the  displaying  of  the  results  in 
Abele's  invention to be statutory subject  matter,  which helps to  consider the 
whole process to be statutory subject matter,60 whereas the very same CCPA 
held that the physical storage of the result, e.g. on a magnetic tape, was not able 
to  draw Walter's  seismic  prospection  system statutory,  In  Re  Walter.61 It  is 
further arguable where the difference between both cases shall  reside in that 
respect. Indeed both methods of data output are physical, but at the same time 
not directly related to the invented algorithm. Both are just (prior art) methods 
of data output, substitutable by any other mean of data output.
c. After Alappat
(1.) In Re Alappat
In the 1994 landmark case  In Re Alappat62 the new United States  Court  Of 
Appeals  For  The  Federal  Circuit  (Federal  Circuit),  which  inherited  the 
jurisdiction on patent cases from the CCPA,  finally uncoupled the question of 
software  patents  from  the  question  of  algorithm  patents,  thus  escaped  the 
Supreme Courts authority in the 'Trilogy'. The reasoning in this decision was 
very arguable indeed.:
The invention was a software that provides so called „anti aliasing“ for digital 
oscilloscopes. An active digital  output device of a computer, i.e.  a screen or 
monitor, usually presents a raster of a certain limited number of lines and rows, 
usually referred to as „the resolution“. If the output of an oscilloscope - usually 
some kind of waveform - is made on the raster of a digital screen it can happen 
that the waveform appears jagged or discontinuous due to the limited number of 
pixels. This especially occurs if the waveform contains rapidly rising and falling 
portions.
Moreover the presence of 'noise' in  the input  signal can cause the rasterised 
waveform to oscillate between two pixel rows when the magnitude of the input 
signal lies between the values represented by the two rows.
60 In Re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (@909) 
61 In Re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (@770)
62 In Re Alappat, 33 F3.d 1526; 31 USPQ2D 1545 [1994]
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An  „anti  aliasing“  filter  overcomes 
these effects by calculating the distance 
of the centre of each adjacent pixel to 
the  waveform's  actual  vector  through 
the raster.  The closer  the  centre  is  to 
the  vector  the  brighter  this  pixel  is 
illuminated on the screen, the farer it is 
the  less  illumination  is  appointed  to 
that  pixel.  The  visual  effect  is  a 
smooth,  unjagged  waveform  as 
illustrated  in  Figure  3.63  The  new 
waveform does not represent any new 
information,  nor  is  it  bound  to  a 
specific output device. The output data 
has just been geometrically rearranged 
to  be  easier  on  the  eye  and  can  be 
directed  to  other  forms  of  output 
devices such as a (matrix-) printer.
Anti aliasing filters are not only used to 
process  the  output  of  a  digital 
oscilloscope but to soft-focus various forms of graphical computer output, e.g. 
the „True Type Fonts“64 of a common word-processing software such as the one 
that was used to create this paper.
An extended PTO Board of Appeals sustained the rejection of the claim which 
comprised the calculation part (the „anti aliasing“) step by step and the use of an 
output device, each recited in the „means-plus-function-language“ that defines 
the physical apparatus related to the invention just as „means for...“. It held that 
the claimed steps combine to  a sole  „mathematical  algorithm for  computing 
pixel information“,65 which is non-statutory in respect to the „Trilogy“ The last 
step,  the  mere  display  of  illuminating  intensity  data,  was  not  considered 
significant post solution activity.
 35 USC § 112 P 6 provides that a patent claim may be drafted in the „means-
plus-function-language“ without reciting the specific structure or material that 
ought to be used for the performance, but comprise the corresponding structure 
or material.66 
The PTO-Board held that 35 USC § 112 P 6 applies to infringement actions 
rather  than to examinations standards67 Hence it concluded that Alappat did not 
63 Georg  Mischler,  The  Lighting  Design  Glossary,  ©  by  Georg  Mischler. 
http://www.schorsch.com/kbase/glossary/aliasing.html <04. July 2005>
The reproduction of this graph is deemed to be in the fair use for scientific purposes. 
64 Vector orientated fonts
65 Alappat, 23 USPQ2d 1340 (@1345) – reversed by In Re Alappat, 33 F3.d 1526; 31 
USPQ2D 1545 [1994]
66 35 USC § 112 P 6: “An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means 
or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts 
in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,  
material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.”
67 Alappat, 23 USPQ2d 1340 (@1347) – reversed by In Re Alappat, 33 F3.d 1526; 31 
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limit his invention to a defined structure - which constituted an apparatus - but 
was trying to patent a process which merely preempted an algorithm.
The  Federal  Circuit reversed  this  decision.  It  held  that  the  Alappat's  claim 
construed in accordance with 35 USC § 112 P 6 is a true apparatus claim. The 
court questioned the applicability of the „mathematical algorithm exception“ to 
true  apparatus  claims  but  then  denied  the  relevance  of  this  question  in  the 
Alappat case. By emphasizing that the claim has to be examined as a whole and 
not  dissected  into  components  it  refrained  from  the  CCPA's  two-parted 
„Freeman-Walter-Abele-Test“.68 Alappat's  „means-plus-function“-claim  when 
seen as a whole referred to a specific structure of semiconductor components (or 
their  equivalents)  and  therefore  to  a  machine,  the  Federal  Circuit  argued: 
„Although   [...]  the  means  elements  [...]  represent  circuitry  elements  that 
perform mathematical  calculations  [...]  the  claimed  invention  as  a  whole  is 
directed to  a combination of  interrelated elements  which combine to  form a 
machine for converting discrete waveform data samples into anti aliased pixel 
illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display means.“69 This data was 
considered to be a useful, concrete and tangible result and not an abstract idea. 
“A general purpose computer becomes a special purpose computer once it is 
programmed [...]“.70 In other words the understanding of the Federal Circuit is 
that  a  general  purpose  computer  which  is  programmed  in  a  certain  way to 
perform specific functions becomes a „new machine“. This idea of a  virtual 
„new machine“ was sufficient to the  Federal Circuit to consider a patentable 
application of maths to nature. Hence it was not necessary to show where the 
anti aliasing algorithm transformed or reduced an article to a different state or 
thing, as required by Diamond v Diehr71 
The Federal Circuit's understanding of 35 USC § 112 P6 significantly enhances 
the patent eligibility of inventions  that  implement mathematical  algorithms.72 
But what the court apparently did not take into consideration is that the structure 
of circuit elements set out in the claim of Alappat does not significantly differ 
from  the  standard  structure  of  any  computer:  means  for  input,  means  for 
(mathematical) processing, means for output. It appears a little fanciful that a 
computer shall transform to a different thing each time it changes the type of 
calculation it performs.
A general purpose computer is designed to perform any kind of calculations, 
including  the  determination  of  distances  between  pixels  and  vectors.  The 
Federal  Circuit failed to show why a general  purpose computer that  is  used 
within  this  scope  becomes  something  else  if  calculating  a  certain  form  of 
abstract output data. As a matter of fact a computer performing „anti aliasing“ is 
not used in a physical different way than if it performed any other calculations. 
The notion of the  Federal Circuit is that  mathematics, once carried out  by a 
USPQ2D 1545 [1994]
68 Fisher, The Patent Eligibility of Computer Implemented Processes in the Wake of In Re 
Alappat, 32 Hous. L. Rev 517 (@532 and 553) [1995]
69 In Re Alappat, 33 F3.d 1526 (@1544) [1994]
70 In Re Alappat, 33 F3.d 1526 (@1545) [1994]
71 Diamond v Diehr 450 U.S. 175 (@183) [1981]
72 Fisher, The Patent Eligibility of Computer Implemented Processes in the Wake of In Re 
Alappat, 32 Hous. L. Rev 517 [1995]
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machine, become a machine. The court stated right before its final conclusion: 
“In any case, a computer, like a rasteriser, is apparatus not mathematics“.73 This 
shows exemplary how the court is ignorant of the fact that computer sciences 
would draw a distinction between the actual physical apparatus, i.e. the general 
purpose computer, and the software, i.e. the rasteriser (implementing the anti 
aliasing algorithm), which is abstract and may be carried out on this or any other 
computer.
(2.) State Street v Signature
Methods of doing business were traditionally not deemed to be statutory subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. This so called “business method exception” had 
it's  roots  in  Hotel  Checking  v.  Lorraine,  when  a  method  of  bookkeeping 
designed to prevent fraud by waiters was ruled unpatentable subject matter.74 
This notion is quite plausible in any free market economy. 
But  if  mathematics,  once  implemented  into  a  software  and  performed  by a 
digital processor, are no longer mathematics but apparatus, hence not subject to 
the  Supreme  courts  holdings  in  Gottschalk  v  Benson,  Parker  v  Flook and 
Diamond v Diehr, than many ways of organizing and running a businesses, e.g. 
calculating  profitability  or  storing  customer's  details,  can  become  statutory 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 if only implemented in a computer program.  
Exactly  that  happened  in  State  Street  Bank  v  Signature  Financial  Group.75 
Subject matter of this case, which was widely recognized by the press,76 was a 
“Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration”.
In essence  the  system is  an  investment  structure  whereby mutual  funds  (so 
called “Spokes”) pool their assets in an investment portfolio (so called “Hub”) 
organized  as  a  partnership.  This  investment  configuration  provides  a 
combination of the economies of scale in investment administration with the tax 
advantages of a partnership.
The claim listed “means for” performing necessary calculations related to the 
investment  system  and  “means  for”  storage  of  data.  All  of  them  could  be 
performed by multi purpose computers and none of them included any kind of 
technical improvement of the computers.  “Hubs” and “Spokes” are financial 
accounts, stored on a computer system.
The court a quo, the US District Court Of Massachusetts, held the system to be 
non-statutory subject matter for two main reasons:
First it solemnly performed a series of mathematical functions with “no further 
physical  transformation  or  reduction  than  inputting  numbers,  calculating 
numbers, outputting numbers and storing numbers”77, and therefore did not pass 
73 In Re Alappat, 33 F3.d 1526 (@1545) [1994]
74 Hotel Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 [1908]
75 State Street v Signature, 149 F.3d 1368 [1996]
76 See for example: “State Street Sets Seismic Precedent”, The National Law Journal 
(September 21, 1998); “What's Next - A Patent for the 401(k)?”, Business Week (October 
26, 1998); “Barbed Wire on the Internet” Forbes (17 May 1999)
77 State Street v Signature, 927 F.Supp 502 (@515) – reversed by 149 F.3d 1368 [1996]
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the “Freeman-Walter-Abele-Test”.
Second  it  was  an  abstract  idea  of  how  to  do  business  and  fell  under  the 
“business methods exception”.
The Federal  Circuit  reversed this  decision.  It rebuked the application of  the 
“Freeman-Walter-Abele-Test”  to  the  case  and  in  this  course  generally 
questioned  it's  applicability  to  determine  the  presence  of  statutory  subject 
matter.  With  a  reference  to  In  Re  Alappat78 it  abnegated  the  mathematical 
character  of  the “Hub and Spokes  System” and classified it  as  “a machine” 
which produces a “useful, concrete and tangible result”.79
Moreover the court laid the business method exception “to rest”. It declared the 
concept obsolete since the introduction of  35 U.S.C. § 10380, and claimed that 
business methods were subject to patentability since then. While the decision 
lacks of references to cases where business method patents have been legally 
granted – probably because no such existed that time – it argued that in other 
cases where patentability has been denied to business methods the rejections 
were not based on a business method exception but other reasons. 
Significantly it quoted three cases in that respect, where patenability has been 
denied on the grounds of the mathematical algorithm exception of the “Supreme 
Court Trilogy”, namely In Re Maucorps81, In Re Mayer82 and In Re Schrader83. 
Very interesting is the argumentation of denying the existence of the business 
exception even in it's founding case Hotel Checking v. Lorraine84:
The  court  in  Hotel  Checking  v.  Lorraine  stated,  that  the  (hotel  booking-) 
”system is  as  old  as  the  art  of  bookkeeping,  i.e.  charging  the  goods  of  the 
employer”.85 “If  at  the  time  of  (the  patent)  application,  there  had  been  no  
system of bookkeeping of any kind in restaurants, we would be confronted with  
the question whether a new and useful system of cash registering and account  
checking is such an art as is patentable under the statute”86
From  this  quotation  the  Federal  Circuit  derived  that  in  Hotel  Checking  v. 
Lorraine the patent had not been denied on the grounds of a business exception 
but rather for it's lack of novelty and invention.87
78 In Re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1540 [1994]
79 State Street v Signature, 149 F.3d 1368 [1996] PAGES?
80 Which requires an invention to be “non obvious” in order to be patentable and was 
introduced to the Patent Act in (1952?)
81 In Re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 = 203 USPQ 812 [1979]
82 In Re Mayer, 688 F.2d 789 = 215 USPQ 193 [1982]
83 In Re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 = 30 USPQ2d 1455 [1994]
84 Hotel Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 [1908]
85 Hotel Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (@469) [1908] quoted by State Street v  
Signature, 149 F.3d 1368 [1996] PAGES?
86 Hotel Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (@472) [1908] quoted by State Street v  
Signature, 149 F.3d 1368 [1996] PAGES?
87 State Street v Signature, 149 F.3d 1368 [1996] PAGES?
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However the words of the Hotel Checking v. Lorraine court can be restated to 
the State Street v Signature case:  The Hub and Spokes System is as old as the 
art of data processing, i.e. input data, process data, output data, store data.  If  
at  the  time  of  (the  patent)  application,  there  had  been  no  system  of  data 
processing of  any kind in  banks,  we would be confronted with  the question  
whether a new and useful system of administrating investment portfolios is such 
an art as is patentable under the statute.
(3.) The USPTO Guidelines for Computer-Related-Inventions
In 1996 the USPTO issued new „Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related 
Inventions“88, which adopted the adjudication of the Federal Circuit. Examiners 
were  instructed  to  do  no  longer  begin  the  examination  of  software  related 
inventions by determining if the claim recites a mathematical algorithm, but by 
assessing the complete specification for it's practical application. Expressly they 
should review the practical functionality of the programmed computer as such 
and not of the software itself.89
This functionality of the programmed computer as a whole needs to be statutory 
subject matter under 35 USC § 101. Abstract ideas, law of nature and natural 
phenomena remained unpatentable for being merely descriptive material.  But 
the guideline distinguish „non-functional descriptive material“, such as music, 
literary  work  or  databases,  from  „functional  descriptive  material“,  such  as 
computer  programmes.  While  the  former  always  remains  non  statutory,  the 
latter when recorded on a computer-readable medium „becomes structurally and 
functionally interrelated to the medium and will be statutory in most cases“90.
In any case the invention is statutory if it  produces a physical transformation 
outside  the  computer  (post  computer  process  activities).  Moreover  the 
manipulation of data representing physical objects or activities such as the CAT-
scans  of  In  Re  Abele91 (pre  computer  process  activities)  is  deemed  to  be  a 
„physical transformation“, thus statutory.92 The mere conveyance of the direct 
data output is not deemed to be such a physical transformation.93 The displaying 
of mathematical results in the form of grey shades is mentioned as an example 
for  non  significant  post-mathematical  use,  because  there  was  no  essential 
difference  between  the  (graphical)  display  of  shades  of  grey and  (numeric) 
display of shade of grey values.94 This example is encompassed with a reference 
to (the non reversed part of)  In Re Abele95 but is in strong contradiction to the 
decision of In Re Alappat96.
88 Patent and Trademark Office United States Department of Commerce, „Examination 
Guidelines for Computer-Related Invention“ Final Version, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/pdf/ciig.pdf <8 July 2005> (USPTO Guidelines)
89 USPTO Guidelines @ 3
90 Idem @ 8
91 See above
92 USPTO Guidelines @ 16
93 USPTO Guidelines @ 17, 21
94 USPTO Guidelines @ 22
95 In Re Abele, 684 F.2d 902
96 In Re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1540
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But even if a computer-related process does not fall under these so called „safe 
harbours“, under the new guidelines it may also become statutory by limiting the 
claim to a useful application within the technological arts.97 Hence a computer 
program that is capable of reducing noise from a signal is not patentanble as 
such,  but  acquires  patentability  if  limited  to  a  certain  end  use,  e.g.  audio 
processing.
The  guidelines  summarized  the  case  law  of  the  CCPA  (resp.  The  Federal 
Circuit)  as  by  then  and  consequently  enabled  a  far  sweeping  issuance  of 
software patents in the United States of America.




Since  then  an  significantly  increasing  number  of  softwarepatents  have  been 
issued.98 Between 1976 and 2002 it  were 200,012 overall.  In 2002 the PTO 
grated 24,891 which represented 14,9 % out of all patents issued. In comparison 
in 1981, the year of  Diamond v Diehr99, it were only 1,275 (1,9%). The largest 
increase can be observed in the year 1997. Figure 4100 shows the total numbers 
of utility patents issued per year in relation to the increasing number of software 
patents among them.
Figure 4: Patents issued by the PTO per year
Nowadays software patents are deemed to be as ordinary as any other kind of 
patents in the U.S.A. However not every software patent that has been issued by 
the PTO is valid.
98 Lundberg/ Durant, Electronic and Software Patents, p.156
99 Diamond v Diehr 450 U.S. 175 [1981]
100 Data from Bessen / Hunt, An Empirical Look At Software Patents, Research on Innovation, 
Working Paper No 013-17/R, http://www.researchoninnovation.org/swpat.pdf <09.07.2005>
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Year Software patents Total utility patents Share of software patents
1976 765 70,226 1.1%
1977 884 65,269 1.4%
1978 897 66,102 1.4%
1979 795 48,854 1.6%
1980 1,080 61,819 1.7%
1981 1,275 65,771 1.9%
1982 1,402 57,888 2.4%
1983 1,443 56,860 2.5%
1984 1,939 67,200 2.9%
1985 2,453 71,661 3.4%
1986 2,657 70,860 3.7%
1987 3,530 82,952 4.3%
1988 3,495 77,924 4.5%
1989 4,974 95,537 5.2%
1990 4,704 90,364 5.2%
1991 5,347 96,513 5.5%
1992 5,862 97,444 6.0%
1993 6,756 98,342 6.9%
1994 8,031 101,676 7.9%
1995 9,000 101,419 8.9%
1996 11,359 109,645 10.4%
1997 12,262 111,983 10.9%
1998 19,355 147,519 13.1%
1999 20,385 153,486 13.3%
2000 21,065 157,595 13.4%
2001 23,406 166,158 14.1%
2002 24,891 167,438 14.9%
b. Newer decisions
Three cases, exemplary for a valid, a maybe valid and an invalid patent, shall be 
mentioned.
(1.) AT&T v Excel
In AT&T Corp v Excel Communications Inc.101 the patent was held valid straight 
forward. The telecommunications service provider AT&T sued it's competitor 
Excel for infringing it's  patent on a „Call  Message Recording for Telephone 
Systems“, issued by the PTO in 1996 as U.S. Patent No. 5,333,184 (the '184 
patent).
A long distance phone call in the U.S.A. may be routed through the facilities of 
various  network  providers.  Customers  have  a  local  exchange  carrier  (LEC) 
which  usually  provides  the  network  access  point  in  the  premisses  of  the 
customer  and  a  primary  interchange  carrier  (PIC)  which  is  the  preselected 
carrier for long distance calls. Switches create data records related to the call, 
comprising  information  such  as  the  originating  and  terminating  telephone 
numbers  and the length of time of the call.  These data  are  essential  for the 
settlement of accounts between the involved telecommunication providers and 
the customer.
The '184 patent merely describes a method of adding new data fields to these 
records  which  identify  the  customer's  PIC  and  especially  contain  boolean 
values102 (so called „flags“) to indicate if the caller's PIC is a particular one and 
whether  the  caller's  and  the  recipient's  PICs  are  identical.  This  aides  long-
distance  carriers  in  providing  differential  billing  treatments  for  customers 
depending upon whether they call a subscriber with the same or a different PIC.
The Federal Circuit sustained the validity of the '184 patent on the basis of it's 
above illustrated case law. Although the patented method did not comprise any 
kind  of  physical  transformation  it  was  held  statutory  since  it  limited  a 
mathematical principle, i.e. the Boolean Principle, to a specific end use. Once 
more the Federal Circuit labelled the requirement of a physical transformation 
as a „misunderstanding“ of the Supreme Court's decision Diamond v Diehr.103 
Hence  AT&T has  a  monopoly on  creating  data  records  of  phone  calls  that 
include the identification of the related PIC. 
(2.) Amazon v Barnes & Noble (“One Click”)
One of the most infamous software patent cases was Amazon v Barnes & Noble, 
better known as the „One Click Case“.104
101 AT&T v Excel, 172 F.3d 1352 = 50 USPQ2d 1447 [1999]
102 Boolean Variable = a logical variable that either has the value „true“ or „false“
103 AT&T v Excel, 172 F.3d 1352 (@1359)
104 Amazon.com v Barnes&Noble, 73 F.2d 1228 = 53 USPTQ2d 1115 [1999] – reversed by the 
Federal Circuit on Februar 2nd, 2001, 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/amazon/amazonbn021401.pdf <09.07.2005>
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In 1999 the USPTO issued a patent labelled „Method and System for Placing a 
Purchase Order Via Communications Networks“ as U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 
(the '411 patent) to the online bookseller Amazon.com Inc.
Prior art systems of online retailers often make use of a so called 'shopping card' 
systems, where customers may add items to buy to a virtual 'shopping basket'; 
when they are done with choosing items, several actions are necessary in order 
to buy the chosen items, such as transmitting payment and shipping details. The 
system described in the '411 patent requires only one action by the customer, i.e. 
one  mouse  click,  to  place  the  order  instantly.  Indeed  this  is  possible  only 
because beforehand the customer subscribed to the service, disclosed necessary 
details and agreed upon that performing the 'one click' (or other single action) 
will be legally construed as an order to buy. The benefits are that customers do 
not need to resend sensitive information such as credit card details, that ordering 
is easier for them105 and probable also that the customer buys faster without 
reconsidering  it's  choice.  Although  the  claim  comprised  a  component  for 
„fulfillment“ of the order, it has been found by the court that this does not refer 
to  the  physical  steps  of  packing  and shipping  the  tangible  items  but  to  the 
generation of the order on the server system of the retailer.106 
Shortly after the the issuance of the '411 patent the U.S. District Court of Seattle 
granted Amazon's move for a preliminary injunction to prohibit it's competitor 
Barnes&Noble  to  use their  'Express  Lane'  feature  on their  website.  'Express 
Lane' also enabled the customer to buy instantly by one click.
The decision raised much tension worldwide107 - probably because Amazon filed 
similar patent applications in other countries108 -  and became one of the key 
cases  in  the  debate  on  software  and business  methods  patents.  While  many 
companies  holding software  patent  portfolios  argue  that  they need  them for 
defensive purposes, Amazon now was accused for „firing the first shot“.109
In February 2001 the Federal Circuit, upon appeal by Barnes&Noble, reversed 
the preliminary injunction.110 The Federal Circuit sustained the District Court in 
it's holding that „Express Lane System“ infringes the '411 patent but concluded 
that Barnes&Noble has mounted a substantial challenge to the validity of the 
patent  in  suit,  which  as  an  error  of  law  the  District  Court  did  not  weight 
appropriately. Sure enough the doubts about the validity of the '411 patent were 
not based on the statutory subject matter issue anymore but entirely on issues 
regarding  the  novelty  and  non-obviousness  of  the  method.  Barnes&Nobles 
defence identified many references that might show that the „one-click“ method 
105 Amazon One Click Shopping,  http://www-cse.stanford.edu/classes/cs201/projects-99-
00/software-patents/amazon.html <09.07.2005>
106 Amazon.com v Barnes&Noble, 73 F.2d 1228 (@1244) [1999]
107 Exemplary: Thurrott,  Amazon patent  concerns heat  up,  WinITPro on March 13rd,  2000, 
http://www.windowsitpro.com/Article/ArticleID/19177/19177.html;  Lettice,  Anti-patent 
protest rains cookies on Amazon.fr's parade, "The Register" on Monday 4th September 2000, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2000/09/04/antipatent_protest_rains_cookies/ <09.07.2005>
108 Including but not limited to the European Union, Australia and Japan
109 Stallman, Letter from RMS to Tim O'Reilly, http://gnu.open-mirror.com/philosophy/amazon-
rms-tim.html
110 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on February 14th, 2001, 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/amazon/amazonbn021401.pdf <09.07.2005>
24
was in the prior art or at lease obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the 
relevant time.
The  decision  was  just  preliminary and  did  not  conclude  anything  upon  the 
validity of the '411 patent. But it shows that even in the post-Alappat United 
States trivial  software patents  might still  be challengeable on the grounds of 
anticipation and obviousness.
The case as returned to the District Court, trials where scheduled for September 
10th ,  2001.  To  the  best  of  the  authors  knowledge,  no  further  public 
documentation is available so presumably there has been a mutual settlement 
out of court.111  
(3.)Eolas v Microsoft 
A very recent and still ongoing case is Eolas Technologies and the University of  
California v Microsoft  Corp.112 In October 1994 the University of California 
filed a patent on a „distributed hypermedia method for automatically invoking 
external  applications  providing  interaction  and  display of  embedded  objects 
within a hypermedia document“ which was granted in 1998 as U.S. Patent No 
5,838,906 (the '906 patent). Later the University granted an exclusive license for 
the '906 patent to Eolas. In essence the patent describes a webbrowser that is 
able  of  displaying  interactive  objects  embedded  in  a  website,  such  as 
spreadsheets,  databases  or  multimedia  contents,  by allocating  and  executing 
browser external application programs installed on the local computer system. 
Today most sophisticated websites contain such data and most webbrowsers are 
able of interactively displaying them.
In 1999 Eolas brought an infringement action against Microsoft for using this 
„invention“ in their  webbrowser application Internet  Explorer  (IE). The U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that the IE is infringing 
the '906 patent and granted Eolas a royalty of US$ 520,562,280.113 The court 
rejected several defences of Microsoft and prevented them from being presented 
to the jury. The Federal Circuit  found these rejections to be an error in law, 
vacated  the  decision  in  part  and  remanded  for  further  proceedings  on  the 
defences, whereas the Federal court obviously strongly doubts the validity of the 
'906 patent when Microsoft's defences are properly considered.
The defences where mainly based on obviousness and anticipation. Microsoft 
presented evidence that prior to Eolas browser a third party inventor, Pei-Yuang 
Wei, developed the 'Viola' web browser with similar features. Wei demonstrated 
Version DX34 of Viola to engineers of the company Sun Microsystems on May 
7th, 1993, more than one year prior to the filing of the '906 patent. Because later 
Wei  improved  Viola  to  Version  DX37  the  District  Court  reasoned  that  he 
abandoned, suppressed or concealed Version DX34 and therefore the disclosure 
to the Sun engineers did not constitute a public use in terms of 35 USC § 102. 
The  Federal  Circuit  rectified  that  an  improvement  of  an  invention  is  not  a 
111 Amazon.com Inc did not respond to a personal query by the author
112 Eolas v Microsoft, 399 F.3d 1325 = 73 USPQ2d 1782 [2005]
113 Eolas v Microsoft, 2004 U.S.Dist. 522 (N.D. Ill., Jan. 14, 2004)
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completely  new  invention  and  does  not  constitute  an  abandonment  of  the 
unimproved version.114 
This might sound like a matter of course, but it was not for the District Court. 
Hence the ascertainment is very notable in respect to software patents: Many 
software developers like Wei might be working on a software project but did not 
apply for  a  patent,  either  because they did not  consider their  software to be 
statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 or they are of the opinion that 
software  should  not  be  patentable  and  therefore  wanted  to  waive  their 
opportunity to gain exclusive rights  for ideological reasons115 or  they simply 
could not afford a patent application. It would be inequitable to grant a patent to 
someone else in such cases.
Another interesting aspect of the decision regards 35 U.S.C. § 271 (f) (1) which 
reads
“Whoever  without  authority  supplies  or  causes  to  be  
supplied  in  or  from the  United  States  all  or  a  substantial  
portion of  the components of  a  patented invention,  where 
such components  are  uncombined  in  whole  or  in  part,  in  
such manner as to actively induce the combination of such 
components outside of the United States in a manner that  
would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within  
the United States, shall be liable as an infringer..”
Both courts where in agreement that a „golden master disk“, which contains the 
computer program's code ready for mass reproduction, constitutes a „substantial 
portion of the component“ in terms of this provision. The courts clarified that 
the scope of application is not limited to physical structures but extends to any 
patented invention including software. Thus if someone supplies a master disk 
containing a patent infringing software outside the U.S.A. that person will be 
liable  under  §  271 (f)  (1).  The  particular  relevance  of  this  rule  to  software 
patents can be enormous, since no other legal system enabled a so far sweeping 
patentability of software - and least of all business methods - as the U.S.A. did, 
which leads us directly to the next chapter.
II. Europe
1. Introduction to the European patent system
Each European country, including the member states of the European Union, 
still has it's own patent law. The call for a unification naturally came along with 
the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC). Since the late 
1960's, after a first effort failed in 1962, a two tracked attempt was strived for:116
On the one hand an international Convention among ratifying countries, which 
were not  necessarily member  states  of  the  EEC,  was intended to  regulate  a 
central  issuance of  patents  which were effective under  the different  national 
114 Eolas v Microsoft, 399 F.3d 1325 (@1333) [2005]
115 This especially applies to the open source and free software movement, which provide 
essential technological solutions
116 Kraßler, Patentrecht, p. 89
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patent laws. On October 7th, 1977 the European Patent Convention (EPC) was 
put  into  force by the first  seven ratifying countries;117 since then another  24 
countries118 joined.  Additionally there  are  five  so called „extension  states“119 
which recognise European patents but are not members of the European Patent 
Organisation (EPOrg). Main item of the EPC is the authority of a newly created 
European Patent Office (EPO) to issue European patents which are directly as 
effective as a national patent in each EPC member state the applicant specifies. 
Infringement cases have to be brought to the national courts which may declare 
the  patent  invalid  only  in  their  country,  Art  138  EPC.  The  system  was 
substantially  influenced  by  the  isochronic  preliminary  works  for  the 
intercontinental Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).120 
On the other hand an unitary Community Patent was - and still is – planned. The 
Community Patent would be autarkic from national patents and could only be 
issued as it could only be declared invalid with the same effect for all member 
states.121 An uniform patent court to be created would have central jurisdiction 
in matters of Community Patents and EPC-'bundle'-patents as well. Since even 
after  decades  of  negotiations  EU  member  states  failed  to  achieve  the 
Community Patent by a treaty,  henceforth the European Council prepares it's 
introduction  by  means  of  a  directive  pursuant  to  Art.  249  of  the  Treaty 
establishing  the  European  Community  (the  „Rome  Treaty“).  The  process  is 
scheduled to be completed by 2010,122 but it's success may be doubted.
2. Early considerations under national laws
The issue of patentability of computer programs arose prior to the instalment of 
the EPC. Provisions in the Convention that try to deal with it were developed 
out of the entirety of national (case-) laws. Hence to examine the genesis of 
Software  Patents  in  Europe,  it  is  expedient  to  have  a  look  at  some  early 
considerations under the national laws.  
a. United Kingdom
(1.) Statutes/ Patents Act
As a matter of course, the UK Patents Act of 1949, did not feature any expressis  
verbis rules for computer programs. But some cases had to be decided by the 
Patent  Office  and  the  Appeal  Tribunal  under  those  statutes  prior  to  the 
instalment of the EPC and it's adoption through the UK Patents Act of 1977. 
117 Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom
118 Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Turkey
119 Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina
120 Haertel, Die geschichtliche Entwicklung des europäischen Patentrechts, margin number 42 
cont.
121 Kraßler, Patentrecht, p.93
122 Kraßler, Patentrecht, p.99
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(2.) Slee & Harris' Application
In 1962 Mr. Slee, Mrs. Harris and British Petroleum Co. Ltd applied for a patent 
claiming a method of operating data processing apparatus in a program entailing 
a number of operations called iterations, characterized in that one iteration was 
initiated before the previous iteration was completed.123
The purpose of the program was to solve linear optimization problems. Sets of 
linear equations or inequalities, which can be descriptive of industrial processes, 
may have an infinite number of solutions. The purpose of an iterative regression 
program is to find the solution which is "optimal" in respect to a given problem, 
e.g. to reduce a certain variable  to the lowest possible value that still meets the 
rules defined in the set of equations or inequalities. The Slee and Harris program 
employs the "Simplex"-method, which itself  was not novel but developed in 
1947 by George Bernard Dantzig,124 to solve such optimization problems. 
The set of equations is arranged as a first matrix (or "Simplextableau"), which is 
then processed by the following steps:
1. Scan the matrix to identify a column containing an element satisfying a 
predetermined condition. This column is called the "pivot column" and 
the position of this element in the matrix is the "pivot point".
2. Perform  a  transforming  operation  called  iteration  on  the  matrix,  to 
produce  a  resultant  second  matrix.  The  exact  algorithm  or  formula 
doesn't need to be understood for the purposes of this paper, but it must 
be noted that no inventive or novel step can be found therein.
3. Provided that another pivot point can be found in the resultant second 
matrix, it is processed in the same way as the first matrix resulting to a 
third matrix.  The process continues until a matrix is generated that is 
devoid of pivot columns. This final matrix gives the optimized solution 
to the problem.
These steps can also be performed without the use of a computer. However due 
to the large number of iterations that are to be performed, the use of a computer 
is functional and was already customary theretofore. The "invention" of Slee and 
Harris was to program the computer in a way that it initiated one iteration, while 
the previous one is still in progress so that a plurality of iterations can be in train 
simultaneously. This method results in a more economical use of the computer.
The superintending examiner objected that this  computer program was not a 
statutory subject matter under sec. 101 (1) Patents Act of 1949. Citing a decision 
by the Australian High Court125 he pointed out, that a method is only patentable 
if  it  results  into  a  vendible  end-product  in  the  sense  of  "any  physical 
phenomenon in which the effect (of the process) may be observed.". The results 
of Slee and Harris' program were no more than intellectual information. Even if 
those  information  might  be  used  in  the  design  and controlling  of  industrial 
processes, such use was "not essential or inherent in the method claimed".126
123 Slee & Harris' Application, 1966 R.P.C. 194 [1966]
124 Wikipedia “Symplex algorithm,”http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simplex_algorithm
125 N.R.D.C.'s Application, 1961 R.P.C. 134 [1961]
126 Slee & Harris' Application, 1966 R.P.C. 194 (197) [1966]
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However during the hearing, the applicants restated their claim and directed it to 
the computer itself. The restated claim described a computer the operating mode 
of which did not elementary differed from others but which was programmed in 
a way that at least two iterations are processed by the arithmetical unit 'at the 
same  time'.  The  restated  claim  was  regarded  as  a  machine  which  has  been 
temporarily modified, hence as a new machine and therefore an invention under 
the  statutory definition.  The  decision  did  not  deal  with  the  requirements  of 
novelty and  non-obviousness,  so  no  final  judgement  on  the  application  was 
made. 
Here almost the same understanding of a computer becoming a different thing 
when  performing  certain  computations  can  be  observed  as  in  the  CCPA's 
holdings since In Re Alappat.127
BP, Slee  and Harris  also filed an application  for  a  patent  on "programming 
means for use in controlling data processing apparatus" in the way described 
above.  These  means  may  be  a  punched  tape  or  cards,  the  punched  holes 
representing the instructions which can be read by the computer.
The hearing officer initially stated rightfully that the 'thing' to be examined was 
the set of instructions, not the way they are manifested. Therefore the "means" 
in that applications were no more than a printed sheet, hence not a patentable 
subject matter. But then the applicants convinced him to proceed  by arguing 
that  these  "means"  were  an  integer  which  physically  co-operated  with  a 
computer and controlled it in a certain way. Therefore the punched cards could 
be likened to a cam, shaped according to certain formulae so that, when fixed to 
a machine, it controlled it in a certain way.
Indeed this comparison is not evidentiary at all: The cam shaped in a certain 
way is in fact a new composition of matter. It differs from other cams and that 
very difference  as  such constitutes  the  invention.  The cam itself  causes  the 
functional effect. But the punched cards are not different from others in their 
function. Their function does not go any further than representing information as 
a pattern of punched holes, notwithstanding what that information is. The fact 
that these cards where machine readable does not make a difference thereto as 
the following example illustrates:
Nowadays even a printed sheet of paper is machine-readable by using an optical 
scanner. Assumed someone equips a computer programmed for text to speech 
synthesis with such an optical scanner, this computer will be able to read out a 
book that is put on the scanners bed. The words in the book will 'instruct' the 
text to speech synthesizer to create certain sonic waves by using the computer 
hardware  in  a  certain  way. Nonetheless  no  one  would  declare  a  printout  of 
Shakespeare's Hamlet to be a patentable invention.  But the argumentation as 
aforesaid applied consequently would lead to that very result.
Slee and Harris'  Application probably was the first  reported decision on the 
issue.128 Despite the shown inconsistencies and although the decision was only 
made  in  the  Patent  Office  and  therefore  not  binding  authority,  subsequent 
decisions by the Patent Appeal Tribunal referred to it.
127 In Re Alappat, 33 F3.d 1526; 31 USPQ2D 1545 [1994]
128 Beresford, Patenting Software Under the European Patent Convention, p. 6
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(3.) Badger Co Inc's Application
Badger's Application129 was  heard  before  the  Patents  Appeal  Tribunal.  The 
applicant sought to patent a "method of mechanically designing and forming a 
visible  drawing illustrating a piping system interconnecting several  operating 
units wherein relevant information was fed into a computer and the computed 
linear data was finally converted into visible drawing." Today the field of art is 
known as computer aided design/ computer aided manufacture (CAD/CAM).
Installations such as chemical plants comprise a number of operating units, such 
as  distillation  towers,  storage  tanks,  pumps,  etc.  which  have  to  be 
interconnected by a piping system.
Badger's application comprised each of the following steps:
1. Drawing (manually) a  plan  of  the  installation  with the  units  to  scale 
positioned about a centre.
2. Measuring the plan, with references to X, Y and Z areas originating at 
the centre to obtain the position and shape of each unit and the location 
of the points intended to be interconnected by piping.
3. Tabulating this data and converting it into a coded form acceptable to the 
computer.
4. Entering the coded data into the computer.
5. Conditioning  the  computer  to  operate  within  constraining  design 
conditions; e.g. two pipes must not intersect or pipes carrying hot liquid 
must be at least six feet away from pipes carrying cold fluit; some space 
must be kept free of pipes etc.
6. Operating  the  computer  to  compute  data  representing  the  required 
interconnection lines, having regard to the predetermined conditions.
7. Storing this data in a form that can be read by a plotter or printer.
8. Use a plotter or printer to produce the drawing.
The preparation and input of data to be computed (steps 1 - 4) was instantly held 
unpatentable.  However  the  "process  for  conditioning  the  operation  of  a 
computer[...]"  to   operate  in  the  said  way was  held  to  be  statutory subject 
matter.130 In other words the required physical aspect of patentable methods was 
now sought  for  in  the  act  of  programming,  an  approach  that  shall  here  be 
dispatched as prima facie misguided.
Alternatively the tribunal allowed the claim when revised to a form that directed 
to  the  computer  arranged  to  operate  in  the  said  way.  So  the  'new 
machine'-approach of Slee and Harris' Application which was later adopted by 
the CCPA was prosecuted further on.
129 Badger's Application, 1970 R.P.C. 36 [1970]
130 Badger's Application, 1970 R.P.C. 36 (40) [1970]
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(4.) Gevers' Application
In  Gever's  Application131 the  alleged  invention  was  directed  to  a  computer 
system that records trademarks and sorts them in such a way that lists can be 
produced which aid similarities and prior registration searches.
The performance of it was fairly easy and can be summarized as follows::
The trademarks (a word or succession of words) were to be entered into the 
computer which processed the words in accordance with certain rules involving 
substitution  of  certain  letters  or  combinations  thereof,  e.g.  letters 
(-combinations) that sound similar such as "I" and "Y" or "CI" and "SI". The 
original and the processed words were then sorted into lists in accordance to 
specific rules and these lists were printed out.
The  tribunal  allowed  the  appeal  abiding  by  the  'new  machine'-approach.  A 
further claim directed to the "mechanographic supports", i.e. the punched cards 
or tapes that contain the data, was allowed on the grounds of the same reasoning 
as in  Slee & Harris'  Application employing the same equation of a computer 
program (stored on a  punched card) being a "mental cam" shaped i a certain 
way.132
That time there was no decision on software patents by a higher court or the 
court of last resort in the United Kingdom, the House Of Lords.
b. Austria
Returning  to  the  Slee  & Harris invention  it  has  to  be  noted  that  the  same 
invention  was  also  patented  in  Austria.  However  in  Lineare 
Programmierungseinrichtung133 the Department for Revocations of the Austrian 
Patent Office, upon appeal by a third party, declared the patent, whether claimed 
on the program, or the programmed computer, or the punched cards likewise 
void  for  the  lack  of  an  inventive  step.  The  Austrians  held  that  a  technical 
invention  in  the  sense  of  the  Austrian  Patents  Act  could  only be  present  if 
natural  forces  are  utilized  by  creating  an  effect  on  things  of  the  physical 
environment. Programs for controlling a computer were not susceptible to patent 
law because they were necessarily based on a mathematical algorithm which 
lacked of a technical character for being mere intellectual matter.  They were 
only an expression of this intellectual matter and did not constitute the solution 
of  a  problem  in  the  technical  field  of  circuitry.  The  implementation  of  an 
algorithm to a computer program was in the average skill of any programmer 
and albeit  being a creative work did not  raise  any problems the solution  of 
which required the performance of an inventive step.
The decision closer examined the claimed method of simultaneously performing 
a plurality of iterations134,  revealing that  the arithmetical  unit  in fact  did not 
131 Gevers' Application, 1970 R.P.C. 91 [1970]
132 Gevers' Application, 1970 R.P.C. 91 (98) [1970]
133 Lineare Programmierungseinrichtung III, Österreichisches Patentamt - Nichtigkeitsabteilung 
GRUR Int. 1968, 381 [1968]
134 see above
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perform  the plurality of iterations at the same time in the precise sense. It rather 
reorganized  the  order  and  time  schedule  on  which  single  steps  of  the 
"Simplex"-algorithm are performed.135
The Department for Revocations disagreed with an opinion that programming a 
computer equalled to the construction of a new circuitry: While the circuitry 
formed a   new physical  apparatus,  the  computer  program merely handled  a 
known apparatus without creating an effect which could not ever be predictable 
for a person skilled in the art and being aware of the capabilities of the machine.
c. Germany
The  following  three  decisions  by  the  German  Federal  Court  of  Justice 
Bundesgerichtshof  (BGH)  show a  notable  parallelism  to  the  U.S.-"Supreme 
Court-Trilogy":
(1.) Dispositionsprogramm 
The decision Dispositionsprogramm136 was given upon appeal after the German 
Federal Patent Court Bundespatentgericht (BPatG) supported the patent office 
Deutsches Patentamt (DPA) in rejecting an application directed to a method of 
determining  changes  of  a  multiplicity  of  main  variables  and  dynamic  sub 
variables which define the main variables by using a computer. The program 
was intended to be used to solve problems in the field of operational disposition 
and organisation. 
The procedure can be summarized as follows:
1. Sort the stock data in a hierarchical order, e.g. devices - sub assemblies 
of the devices - spare parts
2. Furnish  the  stock  data  and  according  dynamic  data  that  is  to  be 
processed together  with  the stock  data  with  addresses  in  which  their 
relation and togetherness is made evident.
3. store stock and dynamic data separately
4. compare the entirety of dynamic data with parts of the stock data and 
recalculate the stock data in accordance with that dynamic data that was 
identified as interrelated to them
5. add any new dynamic data which emerged with step 4 to the other yet 
unprocessed data
6. repeat step 4 and 5 till all stock data is updated
The method is quite abstract and it's benefit to operational accountancy does not 
need to be understood here.
The BGH held that the method described a mathematical algorithm which did 
135 Lineare Programmierungseinrichtung III, Österreichisches Patentamt - Nichtigkeitsabteilung 
GRUR Int. 1968, 381, 382 [1968]
136 Dispositionsprogramm, BGHZ 67, 22 [1976]
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not necessarily need to be performed by a computer. Hence the method was a 
mere instruction to the human intellect. Directing such method to be performed 
by a computer did not alter it's purely mathematical and intellectual nature. 
The BGH pointed out that a computer program was not generally excluded from 
patentability.  However  the  novel  feature  needed to  be found in  a  "technical 
effect".  The  concept  of  a  'technical  effect'-requirement  in  patent  law  was 
developed by earlier German (and other European country's) case law to draw a 
differentiation  between  the  'world  of  phenomena'  and  the  'world  of  mind'137 
whereas the latter is unrestricted and not susceptible to patent law. Today the 
definition of the term "technical effect" is one of the key issues of the European 
patent law, especially in respect to software patents, and at the same time one of 
the most controversial ones.
In  Dispositionsprogramm the  court  defined,  that  a  technical  (and  therefore 
patentable)  invention  must  show  a  systematic  method  of  directly  using 
controllable forces of nature to achieve a causal manageable result.138
The BGH reasoned that the claimed program was a systematic method with a 
causal manageable result but it lacked of a direct use of controllable forces of 
nature  because  the  human intellect,  which  was able  to  perform the  claimed 
method even without any aid of a computer, did not belong to forces of nature.
The question arose whether the linkage of an intellectual exercise to a computer 
does cause to have a 'technical effect' because any program when executed by a 
computer evokes and directly correlates to certain states in the circuitry, which 
are beyond doubt of technical nature. In fact this argument can be linked to the 
'new machine'-approach.
The BGH held, that a program the only novel feature of which resides in the 
algorithm does not cause a new technical effect in the circuitry. An invention 
was to assess by what precisely is claimed to be inventive. Only if the 'core of 
the invention' was technical, was the invention technical.139 In fact that was the 
very 'point of novelty'-approach the CCPA refused to employ in it's reasoning.140 
Due  to  the  BGH's  reasoning  a  computer  program needed  to  require  a  new, 
inventive assembly of the hardware or must feature a generally new manner of 
using the circuitry in order to have a technical effect.141 The underlying notion is 
that a multi purpose computer  ab initio is designed to perform any algorithm. 
Thus under this approach a computer executing a 'new' programmed algorithm 
does not become a 'new machine' because it is still operating within the intended 
and conventional use of such a machine,142 unless it involves such an  effect as 
aforesaid.
137 e.g. in Multiplikationatabelle, RG GRUR 1933, 289 (290) [1933]
138 Dispositionsprogramm, BGHZ 67, 22 (26)[1976]
139 That notion is even more articulate in another decision if the same year: BGH GRUR 1978, 
102
140 See above: In Re Freeman
141 Dispositionsprogramm, BGHZ 67, 22 (29)[1976]
142 Kolle, Technik, Datenverarbeitung und Patentrecht - Bemerkungen zur 
Dispositionsprogramm-Entscheidung des Bundesgerichtshofs, GRUR 1977, 58; 
Dispositionsprogramm, BGHZ 67, 22 (31)
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(2.) Straken
"Straken143" for someone might sound like 'a typical German word'. In fact it is a 
very  unusual  and  technical  term  used  in  the  field  of  ship  and  aeroplane 
construction. Straken are streamlines that form a family of characteristics which 
are descriptive of bodies such as the hull of 
an  aeroplane or  ship  (see  Figure 5)144.  The 
claimed  invention  concerned  a  computer 
program  for  calculating  such  families  of 
streamlines by simulating the deflection of a 
bendable lath which is fixed at certain points 
and stressed with a weight at specific other 
points.  This  simulation  was  done  by 
employing  a  novel  mathematical  algorithm 
which  was  disclosed  in  the  application 
together  with  the  corresponding  listing  of  instructions  in  the  programming 
language FORTRAN. The program did not itself create the design of the body 
but created a virtual model of it according to the input of the operator.
Abiding by their opinion in Dispositionsprogramm  BPatG and BGH refused the 
patent due to it's lack of a 'technical effect'. Likewise the U.S. supreme Court in 
Parker  v  Flook.,145 the  BGH  had  to  decide  whether  the  identification  of  a 
technical post solution application of the program causes it to have a 'technical 
effect' itself. The court held that the nature of the  Straken program was non-
technical, while a technical field is only entered in the course of it's post solution 
non-inventive application. If some invention was a technical one, it would not 
lose its technical nature even if the post solution application is non-technical, 
because the latter did not form a part of the invention. In the logic reverse a non-
technical invention could not become "technical" just because an application of 
it's product is directed to a technical field, again because the latter did not form a 
part of the invention.146 
The fact that the the prior art method of manually measuring streamlines was 
technical did not alter the non-technical nature of the invented program, because 
the program did not constitute  an improvement of that  technical method but 
substituted it with something non-technical.
(3.) Antiblockiersystem 
In the 1980 decision  Antiblockiersystem147 the BGH reversed the repeal  of a 
computer related patent by the BPatG. The applicant invented an electronically 
controlled anti-lock braking system (ABS) for motor vehicles. 
When a car brakes, high pressured brake fluid runs through the intake valve into 
the brake cylinder. An ABS causes the intake valve to close and the outlet valve 
to open in the very moment the wheel looses adhesion. The effect is that the 
143 Straken, BGH GRUR 1977, 657 [1977]
144 http://studweb.studserv.uni-stuttgart.de/studweb/users/lrt/lrt31151/index.htm, © by unknown.
The reproduction of this graph is deemed to be in the fair use for scientific purposes.
145 Parker v Flook 437 U.S. 584 [1978]
146 Straken, BGH GRUR 1977, 657 (658) [1977]
147 Antiblockiersystem, BGH GRUR 1980, 849 [1980]
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brake  pressure  decreases  and  the  wheel  gains  adhesion  again.  When  the 
adhesion reaches a satisfying level the ABS causes both valves to close so the 
brake pressure is maintained. The invented ABS featured circuitry that monitors 
the wheels  and determines  the exact  moments to  open and close  the  valves 
electronically by executing a control algorithm. The method was more precise 
than prior art ABSs and was able to work properly even if the braking car is 
coasting on alternating surfaces, i.e.  enters glaze during the brake procedure. 
The application was not directed to a certain circuitry but only described their 
function.
The BPatG opined that the functions the circuitry carried out - when seen alone - 
were  an  intellectual  exercise in  the  Dispositionsprogramm-sense.148 But  the 
BGH held to clearly identify the required 'technical effect' here. The invention 
was  intended  to  achieve  the  optimal  retarding  effort  by  directly  using 
controllable natural forces. It made use of the natural phenomenon that in the 
optimal moment to maintain brake pressure, which depends on the consistence 
of the road surface, the circumferential speed of the monitored wheel reaches a 
certain  acceleration  value.  The  circuitry  was  programmed  to  detect  that 
acceleration value from the monitoring signal and to initiate the necessary steps. 
The fact that the inventor did not bind his invention to a certain circuitry was 
irrelevant  for  the  'technical  effect'  because  the  very  could  be  found  in  the 
optimisation of the retarding effort. 
d. Switzerland 
Swiss courts held a similar opinion on the requirement of a 'technical effect' as 
the (not computer related) case of that time Nachschlagewerk149 illustrates. 
Following that adjudication the patent office regularly rejected claims directed 
to computer programs. One reported case was Bewehrungs-Rechenprogramm.150 
Subject of the application was "a process for calculating the steel reinforcement 
required  for  concrete  building  blocks  by  using  a  programmable  computer", 
whereas  the  used  computer  itself  was  known in  the  art.  In other  words  the 
invention was the computer program. The Swiss patent office Amt für geistiges 
Eigentum rejected  the  application  on  the  ground that  setting  up  a  computer 
program constituted a purely mental and not a technical process. The reasoning 
of  the  office  was  almost  identical  with  that  of  the  German  BGH  in 
Dispositionsprogramm151 and shall therefore not be repeated here.
e. France
The author did not become aware of any French cases of that time which deal 
with  software  patents.  The  potential  reason  for  this  is  that  due  to  a  clear 
statement in the statutes there were no such cases that have been brought to 
court:  In  1968  a  new patent  law  was  enacted  in  France  which  contained  a 
general exclusion on patentability of computer programs.152
148 BPatG GRUR 1979, 111
149 Nachschlagewerk, Schweizerisches Bundesgerichts GRUR Int. 1969, 141
150 Bewehrungs-Rechenprogramm, Amt für geistiges Eigentum, IIC 1970, 149 
151 Dispositionsprogramm, BGHZ 67, 22 [1976]
152 Beresford, Patenting Software Under the European Patent Convention, p. 11
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3. EPO Cases
a. Statutes/ Art. 52 EPC
The scope of an European Patent is defined in Art. 52 EPC:
“Patentable inventions:
(1)  European  patents  shall  be  granted  for  any  inventions  
which  are  susceptible  of  industrial  application,  which  are 
new and which involve an inventive step.
(2)  The  following  in  particular  shall  not  be  regarded  as 
inventions within the meaning of paragraph 1:
(a)  discoveries,  scientific  theories  and  mathematical  
methods;
(b) aesthetic creations;
(c)  schemes,  rules and methods for  performing mental  
acts, playing games or doing business and programs for 
computers;
(d) presentations of information.
(3) The provisions of paragraph 2 shall exclude patentability  
of the subject-matter or activities referred to in that provision  
only to the extent to which a European patent application or  
European patent relates to such subject-matter or activities 
as such.
(4) [...]”
While  at  the  first  glance  these  statutes  exclude  computer  programs  from 
patenability, a closer inspection reveals the loophole in subsection 3.: Computer 
programs (amongst  the  other  listed  subject  matters)  are  only excluded from 
patentability if the patent is directed to the program "as such".  It's purpose is to 
narrow down the exclusion in a sense that they could not be read as excluding 
things which traditionally are suitable for protection and include true inventions 
merely on the ground that they involve the usage of a computer program.
Various  verbalisations  and  formations  of  the  list  of  exclusions  had  been 
discussed in the course of the drafting of the EPC, all of which tried to clarify 
the  extend  of  the  subject  matter  exclusion  in  the  aforesaid  sense.153 
Unfortunately none of them, including the chosen one, was able to give a clear 
answer to the question how to define a 'truly inventive' computer program which 
shall  be  excluded  from the  exclusion.  In  fact  it  seems  that  the  work  group 
preparing the convention hesitated or was unable to give a final answer and 
decided to leave it to the courts. Due to the fact that the EPC was designated to 
be interpreted by many different, autarkic jurisdictions at the same time, this 
decision for uncertainty put the EPC onto a slippery path right from the outset. 
153 Beresford, Patenting Software Under the European Patent Convention, p. 15
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b. The Board Of Appeals
Pursuant to Art. 106 cont. EPC decisions by the  EPO can be appealed to the 
EPO Boards  Of  Appeal  within  a  period  of  two months.  In order  to  ensure 
uniform application of the law, or if an important point of law arise, the related 
question can be referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal, Art 112 EPC. This 
usually happens if two boards contradict each other. Indeed hitherto there is only 
one  board  with  competence  to  'computer  implemented  inventions',  so  no 
decision on the related issues has ever been given by the Enlarged Board yet.
(1.) Vicom
The first basic decision on a computer related patent by the Board of Appeal 
was Vicom.154 The object of the invention was an enhanced technique of digital 
image processing,  i.e.  filtering,  while  the  method might  also  be  utilized  for 
filtering of other signals that can be depicted in two dimensional arrays.
Such  filtering  is  done  by  extracting  a  certain  array  around  a  certain  pixel, 
processing  that  array with the filtering  algorithm and placing it  back to  the 
image. This is repeated for each pixel in the image or part thereof which is to be 
filtered. Vicom's invention – expressed in simple terms - was a method that 
extracted and processed substantially smaller arrays for each pixel than prior art 
methods, but repeated the processing several times. The outcome was a slightly 
less  accurately  filtered  image,  but  substantially  less  demand  for  computing 
power to create it. The application also disclosed new hardware for carrying out 
the  program. As  the  applicants  admitted,  in  principle  it  was  possible  to 
implement  the  method  by  a  suitably  programmed  conventional  computer, 
although such a computer may not be optimized for it.
The Board of Appeals disagreed with the examiner's rejection of the patent as 
being  a  mathematical  method  holding  that  "even  if  the  idea  underlying  an 
invention  may  be  considered  to  reside  in  a  mathematical  method  a  claim 
directed  to  a  technical  process  in  which  the  method  is  used  does  not  seek 
protection for the mathematical method as such."155 
However  the Board of Appeals  went  further  ahead in  Vicom,  holding that  a 
novel technical feature existed in not only the hardware, but also in the method. 
This  'technical  feature'  was  namely  to  identify  in  a  substantial  increase  in 
processing  speed  compared  to  the  prior  art  method and in  the  procedure  of 
processing  an  image  “seen  as  a  whole”.  The  latter  was  based  on  the 
understanding that the digitalized image was a representation of the physical 
image.  While  a  new method of  filtering  a  physical  image by hardware,  i.e. 
optical means, would be patentable in principle, no difference should be made if 
the use of  modern technical  means,  i.e.  a  computer,  is  chosen for  the  same 
purpose. The Board argued that the choice of one or the other way of achieving 
the same result, namely a filtered image, was not of an essential nature but based 
on technical and economical considerations which bore no relationship to the 
154 Vicom, EPO Case# T 0208/84 [1986], All decisions of the EPO Boards Of Appeals can be 
looked up under [http://legal.european-patent-office.org/]
155 Headnote 1 of EPO Case# T 0208/84 [1986]
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inventive  concept  as  such.  Decisive  was  what  technical  contribution  the 
invention,  when considered as a whole, makes to the known art, not the way 
the contribution is achieved. This approach was henceforth referred to as the 
“contribution test”. 
In  fact  the  EPO-Board  thereby  contradicted  the  Straken-holding  that  the 
substitution of a technical act by a non-technical one did not render the latter to 
be technical. But more remarkable is the reasoning that the “substantial increase 
in processing speed” was 'technical'. It must be noted that Vicom's program did 
not really increase the physical processing speed of the computer but decreased 
the computations needed to be performed. If someone performed the algorithm 
mentally –  which in  principle  is  possible  –  the same increase  in  processing 
speed  would  be  observable.  The  improvement  was purely mathematical  and 
abstract of the different ways that mathematics may be performed. Consequently 
with the same reasoning applied even the Binomial theorem156 (given that it was 
novel and non-obvious) might be patentable if merely translated to a computer 
program and directed to some end use, since that computer program would show 
an  increase  in  processing  speed  compared  to  a  computer  program that  was 
written without knowledge of the Binomial theorem and would have to 'multiply 
out' the brackets.
(2.) Koch & Sterzel
Subject  matter  of  Koch  & Sterzel157 was  a  X-ray apparatus  for  radiological 
imaging, using a computer program to determine the right relation of parameters 
such  as  tube  current,  tube  voltage  and  exposure  time  to  ensure  optimum 
exposure with sufficient protection against overloading of the X-ray tube. The 
data processing unit controlling the tube by carrying out the computer program 
initially maintained both the X-ray tube voltage and the product of tube current 
and  exposure  time  constant,  while  decreased  the  tube  current  from  the 
maximum permissible value until the relevant rating curve permits an exposure. 
Where no exposure was possible and the maximum permissible exposure time 
had been reached, it increased the tube voltage and decreased the tube current as 
a function of the secondary requirement of constant density until the relevant 
tube rating curve did allow an exposure. Finally it determined the most optimal 
exposure parameters by applying different values starting with the smallest focal 
spot optimum for image resolution. Moreover the program set the external high-
voltage generator according to the determined values.
Upon appeal by a third party, the Board of Appeals sustained the granted patent. 
Although  the  program  merely  produced  intellectual  information,  this 
information was the solution to a technical problem, i.e. the optimal parameters 
for creating a certain radiogram. This "technical effect" did not need to occur 
during the execution of the computer program. The only relevant fact was that it 
occurs at  all.  The Board disallowed an argumentation,  that any teaching was 
non-technical if in it's essence it states a rule that can be carried out just by the 
156 e.g. the known formula: (a+b)2 = a2 + 2ab + b2
157 Koch & Sterzel, EPO Case# T 0026/86 [1987]
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human  intellect.158  Particularly  the  Board  disagreed  with  a  view  that  an 
invention which involves a mix of technical and non-technical features was to 
be weighed and if the greater part was non-technical the patent was to be denied.
(3.) IBM/ Text Processing
IBM/ Text processing159 was a case in which  the Board denied the patentability. 
The well known manufacturer of business machines tried to patent a "method of 
generating  a  list  of  expressions  semantically  related  to  an  input  linguistic 
expression" using a computer. The purpose was i.e. to create a list of synonyms 
to the input expression. IBM pointed out that the method was making use of two 
functionally  separate  memories,  one  containing  the  database  of  linguistic 
expressions,  the  other  containing  a  presorted  index  thereto  which  enabled  a 
faster extraction of the semantically related expressions from the first memory.
The  Board  of  appeals  concluded  that  the  subject  matter  of  the  claim  was 
directed to the field of linguistics and did not concern an invention within the 
meaning of Art. 52 EPC. Semantic relationship between expressions were not of 
a technical nature and could be found by performing mental acts only with no 
technical means involved. Indeed such a system might be patentable if it made a 
contribution to a field outside the range of matters excluded from patentability. 
But  no such was present  in  IBM's application.  Each of  the technical  means 
disclosed were conventional and especially the use of “two memories”, an index 
and a database, was in no way inventive. In fact the two “functionally separate 
memories” could be different sections of one single (conventional) memory not 
working in an unusual way. Hence IBM's text processor failed the “contribution 
test”
(4.) Sohei
In  Sohei160  a patent related to a business method was allowed. However the 
reason  for  this  allowance  was  that  the  Board  meant  to  identify  a  technical 
contribution there.
The claim in it's amended form was directed to a “computer system for plural 
types of management including at least financial and inventory management.” 
The system created an interactive image of a single transfer slip on the screen of 
the display,  which had a  format  commonly used for  (at  least)  financial  and 
inventory management. Data that has been entered by way of this slip-image 
input mask was not only stored in a journalized day-book file but also in various 
other database files each of which was formatted in a special manner for the 
purposes  of  the  different  types  of  management,  i.e.  “an  item master  file,  a 
commodity master file, a journalized accumulation file and an inventory file”. 
Finally  the  system  comprised  a  function  to  extract  those  datasets  from  the 
database  files  which  are  required  for  the  respective  type  of  management  to 
158 Reason 3 of EPO Case# T 0026/86 [1987]
159 IBM/ Text processing, EPO Case# T 0052/85 [1989]
160 Sohei, EPO Case# T 0769/92 [1994]
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perform. 
Like in Koch & Sterzel the Board identified a mix of technical and non-technical 
features. This time the mix was not of a technical and a mathematical part but of 
a  technical  and  a  business  administration  part.  Nonetheless  if  a  technical 
contribution could be identified either in a technical problem to be solved or in a 
technical effect achieved by the solution, the mix was patentable.
The Board identified the technical contribution in the teaching to distribute the 
data entered through a single input screen to the different mentioned files for 
different purposes and to cause the computer to perform different functions on 
the  files  for  different  purposes,  by arguing  that  this  “would  clearly  require 
technical  considerations”.  Unfortunately  they  omitted  to  specify  these 
“considerations”.
It  is  questionable  that  the  Board  did  in  a  satisfying  way substantiate  their 
holding that the programming of the aforementioned features required technical 
considerations  which  were  able  to  award  the  character  of  a  technical 
contribution. The way of updating and processing the several database files are 
in  the  conventional  use  of  a  computer,  while  the  overall  idea  of  creating  a 
plurality of  databases  for  different  purposes  is  subject  to  a  mere concept  of 
organizing  and  running  a  business.  However  other  observers  recognise  the 
improvement of the user's convenience as being a technical contribution.161
(5.) IBM/ Computer Program Product
In  1997 the  Board  clarified  that  even  a  computer  program (and  not  only a 
programmed computer) can be patented under the EPC as a Computer program 
product162.  The  technical  facts  of  the  case  can  be  omitted  here.  The  Board 
decided that “a computer program product is not excluded from patentability 
under Article 52(2) and (3) EPC if, when it is run on a computer, it produces a 
further  technical  effect  which goes  beyond the  'normal'  physical  interactions 
between program (software) and computer (hardware)".
In fact any program produces a technical effect when running on a computer, i.e. 
it alters the electric current in the integrated circuitry. The Board reasoned that 
this  effect  is  common to all  programs and could  therefore be no distinctive 
criterion.  But  if  a running program created a further technical effect  – in or 
outside the computer – this effect constituted an invention. A claim directed to 
such computer program was not directed to the program “as such”, but to the 
creation of the further technical effect by means of a program.
In principle this decision is welcome because where ever the borderline between 
patentable and non-patentable subject matter is to be drawn; the pivotal point 
can  not  reasonably be  whether  one  and the  same invention  is  claimed as  a 
program or as a programmed computer.
161 Beresford, Patenting Software Under the European Patent Convention, p. 182
162 Computer program product, EPO Case# T 0931/95 [2000]
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(6.) Pension Benefits Systems
The Board refused to vouch the claim which concerned a business method  in 
Pension  Benefits  System163; but  the  main  significance  is  that  the  Board 
abandoned their 'contribution test' of Vicom164 in this decision.
The subject was a method (respectively a programmed computer) for controlling 
a pension benefits system which, after entering and storing personal data of each 
employee  of  the  subscribing  employers  to  a  database,  was  capable  of 
determining such data as the average age of all employees, the periodical cost of 
the life insurance for all employees of a certain employer, administrative, legal, 
trustee and government premium yearly expenses for a certain employer, each 
employers  monetary contribution  to  a  master  trust  and  the  periodic  benefits 
payable by the master trust to each enrolled employee upon death. Different to 
Sohei165 the application did not disclose a certain structure of the database.
The  Board  held  that  all  the  features  of  the  method  claim  were  steps  of 
processing and producing information having purely administrative,  actuarial 
and/or  financial  character  and  were  typical  steps  of  business  and  economic 
methods. They did not teach any method that went beyond the general way of 
using  data  processing  means,  while  the  mere  method  of  doing  business  is 
excluded subject matter.
The  programmed  computer  was  straight  away  regarded  as  an  apparatus,  a 
physical entity and therefore non-excluded subject matter in the sense of Art 52 
EPC.  The  'technical  contribution'  was  no  criterion  for  the  subject  matter 
question anymore. However in order to be patentable there must be involved an 
inventive step which needed to be solely in a technical field. The inventive step 
must reside in making a contribution to a non-excluded field of the art which is 
new and non-obvious  to  a  person  skilled  in  that  art,  without  regarding  any 
contribution to an excluded field of the art. Thus the assessment needed to be 
carried out from the point of view of a programmer having knowledge of the 
concept and structure of the improved pension benefits  system; a patent was 
only to be granted if from this point of view any inventive steps are still to be 
performed in order to create the claimed invention. But merely implementing 
the  concept  and  structure  of  the  pension  benefits  system  into  a  computer 
program formed  part  of  the  prior  knowledge of  the  skilled  person  and was 
therefore not inventive.
The crucial difference between this new 'inventive step' approach which in fact 
equals to the 'point of novelty' approach, and the former 'technical contribution' 
approach is that the latter administered two separate comprehensive survey tests 
to the claim. First it was to search for anything in the overall method that was 
technical. If something like that was found, it was then to search – again in the 
overall method – for anything (else) which is new and non obvious, whereas it 
did not necessarily needed to be technical. The new approach first omitted the 
absurd statement that a computer was not technical but then in a second step 
gathered the two separate tests to a single test for the presence of an inventive 
163 IBM/ Pension Benefits System, EPO Case# T 1173/97 [1997]
164 Vicom, EPO Case# T 0208/84 [1986]
165 Sohei, EPO Case# T 0769/92 [1994]
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step: Something in the overall method must be found which is both: technical 
and at the same time inventive (novel and non obvious to a person skilled in the 
art).
(7.) Comvik
In the subsequent Comvik166 decision the Board applied and further consolidated 
the 'inventive step approach'. The patent related to the use of single-user multi-
identity integrated circuit cards as subscriber identity module in GSM mobile 
units.
The “Global System for Mobile Communications” (GSM) is the most popular 
standard for mobile phones in the world. In Europe and Africa it holds a marked 
share of almost 100%. Mobile phone units in the GSM system do not have a fix 
subscriber  identity,  they are  'user  neutral'.  Only when a  “Subscriber  Identity 
Module” (SIM) is  connected to the phone unit,  i.e.  an “Universal  Integrated 
Circuit Card” (UICC) containing the SIM (therefore the such UICC are usually 
called SIM card) is  inserted into the smart  card reader that every GSM unit 
features,  the  unit  gets  “personalized” and can log in  to  the  cellular  network 
using  data  obtained  from  the  SIM,  i.e.  the  so  called  International  Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (IMSI). Whenever a GSM unit is logged in to a GSM cell, a 
global  switching  system  of  network  location  register  databases  holds  the 
information  that  this  certain  IMSI  is  registered  in  that  certain  GSM  cell. 
Accordingly incoming calls for this IMSI are set against the corresponding cell 
and  then  against  the  single  mobile  unit  located  anywhere  in  that  cell,  on  a 
worldwide basis. It should be understood that a SIM is not a mere dataset but a 
little computer program (a so called GSM application) providing for example 
means for en- and decryption and an UICC is not a mere storage device but a 
little computer carrying out the SIM.
Comvik's idea was to provide a SIM card which can handle at least two IMSIs. 
The user can selectively activate one or the other identity to be used to log into 
the GSM network  in  order  to  e.g.  obtain differential  billing for  private  and 
service  calls  without  replacing  the  UICC.  The  applicants  claimed  that  the 
capability of their SIM card to adopt different IMSIs warded a novel character to 
the whole interaction between SIM and network databases.
The Board did not vouch the claim. It reasoned that any invention had to be 
understood as a solution to a technical problem. All features of a patent claim 
should contribute  to  the solution.  Assessing such a solution  for  patentability 
required  the  identification  of  the  technical  field  of  the  invention,  the 
identification of the closest prior art in that field and the identification of the 
technical problem to be solved. It had then to be examined whether the technical 
features – and only the technical features – which formed the solution, could be 
derived by a person skilled in the identified field in an obvious manner from the 
state of the art. If the invention solved several technical problems unrelated to 
each  other,  each  solution  had  to  be  considered  in  isolation.  If  no  technical 
problem can be derived from the application, no invention in the sense of Art 52 
166 Comvik, EPO Case# T 0641/00 [2002]
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EPC existed.
In Comvik's application the Board identified three features: Having more than 
one  SIM  on  a  single  UICC;  registering  with  one  particular  identity  to  the 
network location registers; and providing differential billing. Each of which had 
to be assessed in isolation in the above mentioned way.
The technical field of the fist feature was that of GSM network programming. 
The problem to be solved was implementing two SIMs into one UICC. However 
the examination of prior art revealed that the UICCs used in GSM networks 
were already designed to contain more than one GSM application. Since a SIM 
is a GSM application, the possibility of implementing more than one to SIM to a 
single UICC was obvious to the person skilled in the art.
The  second  feature  was  also  in  the  field  of  GSM  network  programming. 
However there was no problem to be solved. It was a common feature of GSM 
networks that each SIM has an allocated IMSI and that once a mobile unit is 
logged in with a particular SIM, the network location registers will be updated 
automatically, i.e.  setting incoming calls for that particular IMSI against  that 
very mobile unit using the corresponding SIM.
The  third  feature  of  differential  billing  after  all  was  a  financial  and 
administrative concept and was therefore not able to contribute to an inventive 
step.
One fact is clear from the last two decisions: Business methods patents in the 
sense of State Street Bank v Signature167 remain non-allowable in Europe. But it 
is  a  crucial  point  whether  the  Board  of  Appeals  intends  to  apply their  new 
“inventive step approach” to business method related patents only, or to other 
cases as well. Patents like in the Vicom case probably would not have passed the 
“inventive step test” for the reason that the only novel and non-obvious step in 
the overall process of image processing was the underlying algorithm which – 
under the new approach – may not contribute to the inventive step for its lack of 
a technical character. Whereas the (technical) implementation of the algorithm 
to  a  computer  program  (or  the  programmed  computer,  or  the  act  of 
programming  that  computer,  whatsoever)  is  in  the  average  knowledge  of  a 
person  skilled  in  the  art,  hence  obvious.  The remaining  steps  in  the  overall 
process,  i.e.  digitalizing  the  image and printing  it  out,  indeed  where  purely 
technical but as purely non novel.
Indeed it all depends on the definition of the word “technical”. The drafters of 
the European Patent Convention passed that decision to the Boards of Appeal, 
but they refuse to receive it.
c. Granting practise
An exact statistic on the number of software patents, and patents on computer 
implemented inventions respectively, that have been granted by the EPO is not 
possible,  since  there  is  no  class  or  other  identification  which  would  clearly 
distinct them from other patents. The European anti software patents lobby has 
167 State Street v Signature, 149 F.3d 1368 [1996]
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estimated a number of about 30,000.168 
They  range  from  (clearly  patentable) 
computer  controlled  industrial 
facilities  to  absolute  trivial  methods 
such as e.g. the use of so called “tabs” 
in graphical user interfaces (see Figure 
6  which  is  taken  from  the  actual 
application  for  European  patent 
EP0689133.  The  pointers  32  and  36 
indicate  the  “tabs”)169 It  should  be 
noted  that  the  latter  is  an  extreme 
example, but unfortunately it is not an 
isolated  one.  Indeed  this  patent's 
validity  in  Europe  is  very doubtable, 
but the fact that it has been granted by 
the EPO reveals the ambiguous legal position. It is also doubtable whether the 
holders  of  patents  like  EP0689133  will  ever  bring  lawsuits  against 
infringements of their patents. In fact that would cause a lot of work for the 
courts since such trivial features like “tabs” are customary in modern computer 
applications.
4. Newer decisions under national laws
As mentioned earlier infringement suits are still subject to the national patent 
law of contracting states of the EPOrg. The national courts have 'the last word' 
regarding the validity of patents granted by the EPO. The provisions of the EPC 
have been adopted to the national Patent Acts. The contents of Art. 52 EPC can 
be found in section 1 of e.g. the UK Patents Act or the German Patents Act. So 
the national courts are basically interpreting the same law as the EPO Boards of 
Appeals does. This chapter examines whether the national courts were able to 
lift the fog around European software patents. 
a. United Kingdom
(1.) Merrill Lynch's Application
Merrill Lynch 170 appealed to the Royal Court of Appeal after their application to 
patent a “data processing apparatus for making an automated market for one or 
more securities” was refused and the refusal sustained by the Patent Court.
The claim described a system which received transaction orders from customers, 
retrieved the best current bid and asked prices, qualified customers orders for 
execution,  executed  the  orders  and  reported  the  trade  particulars  to  the 
168 Foundation  for  a  Free  Information  Infrastructure,  European  Software  Patent  Statistics, 
http://swpat.ffii.org/patents/stats/index.en.html 
169 European Patent EP0689133 (corresponding  to US Patent #5,546,528 and Japanese Patent 
#JP2005025775), http://v3.espacenet.com/textdoc?IDX=EP689133
170 Merrill Lynch's Application, 1988 R.P.C. 553 [1988]
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Figure 6
customers. Moreover it  monitored stock inventory and profits  for the market 
maker.  The system could be implemented to any data-processing equipment. 
However each of the steps the system performed was described in the “means 
for...”-language and the applicants argued they were claiming a machine and not 
a computer or business method 'as such'. 
The  Patent  Court  reasoned  that  Merrill  Lynch's  invention  was  a  computer 
program and a business method, both of which were excluded subject matter, 
just  in disguise of a computer.  Something could not  be patented if  the only 
inventive step resided in the contribution of excluded subject matter alone.
The Court of Appeal sustained the decision but not the reasoning in the last 
sentence of the previous section. It argued that a discovery also was an excluded 
subject matter, while it was a well established principle that showing a way to 
utilize a discovery was patentable even if the only non obvious feature consisted 
in the discovery. This argumentation was based on a reference to  Genentech's  
Application171, another case of the same time which concerned a patent based on 
the discovery of the DNA sequence of the human gene responsible for making 
the  valuable  hormone  t-PA.  The  'excluded  subject  matter  issue'  in  the 
Genentech case was regarded to be closely related and in fact both isochronic 
cases have to be read in connection. However it was agreed with the Paten Court 
that Merrill Lynch's invention was excluded subject matter in disguise of a non 
excluded subject matter. In Genentech the court stated in respect of the Merrill  
Lynch  case  “it  would  be  nonsense  for  the  Act  to  forbid  the  patenting  of  a 
computer program, and yet permit the patenting of a floppy disc containing a 
computer  program,  or  an  ordinary  computer  when  programmed  with  the 
program; it can well be said, as it seems [...], that a patent for a computer when 
programmed or for the disc containing the program is no more than a patent for 
the program as such.”172 The  Merrill Lynch decision expressly referred to this 
dictum.173. Further referring to Vicom.174 and the 'technical contribution test' the 
Court of Appeal asked which contribution the invention seen as a whole made 
to  the  known  art  and  concluded  that  the  only  contribution  was  a  business 
method, hence excluded subject matter.
(2.) Gale's Application
In Gale's Application175 the Court of Appeal finally discarded the Patent Appeal 
Tribunal's ill  conceived notion of the  Slee & Harris  time that a fixed storage 
device such as punched cards containing a computer program was comparable 
to a shaped cam in a machinery.176 
Mr. Gale claimed to have found out a better and faster method of calculating 
square roots  by using a new algorithm which eschewed divisions  and rather 
171 Genentech's Application, 1989 R.P.C. 147 on appeal 1987 R.P.C. 553 
172 Genentech's Application, 1989 R.P.C. 147 (240
173 Merrill Lynch's Application, 1988 R.P.C. 553 (566) [1988]
174 Vicom, EPO Case# T 0208/84 [1986], http://legal.european-patent-
office.org/dg3/biblio/t840208ep1.htm
175 Gale's Application, 1991 R.P.C. 305 [1991]
176 See above: Slee & Harris' Application
45
employed multiplication. Why it was special was that he claimed the computer 
program implementing the algorithm, stored on a ROM chip. A ROM chip is a 
piece of circuitry which stores some data in a fixed and unalterable manner. For 
clarification: Mr. Gale did not invent the ROM chip, but used a common ROM 
chip to store his program on it.
The court ruled that following the Merrill Lynch holding, the program could not 
be patentable if put on a floppy disk and it made no difference that it was put on 
a ROM chip instead. No technical contribution was made because what was new 
was a mathematical method. 
The attentive reader notices not only that the Court of Appeals was too clever to 
be distracted by the appearance of a ROM chip, from the fact that it is no more 
than a data storage device.  But also that  the court  already left  the so called 
'contribution test' of the EPO. It did not ask which contribution the application 
made when seen as a whole, but asked whether the actual inventive step is in a 
non excluded field.  The Court  thereby implicitly contradicted it's  holding in 
Merrill Lynch's Application.177 If Gale's invention was assessed 'as a whole' in 
terms of  the 'contribution test',  it  would have been apparent  that  his  (purely 
mathematical) trick causes the very same kind of “increase in processing speed” 
as in e.g. Vicom178.
(3.) Fujitsu Ltd’s Application
Fujitsu  Ltd's  Application179 was  directed  to  a  method  (and  apparatus)  for 
modelling a synthetic crystal structure for designing inorganic materials using a 
computer. The operator could select an atom, a lattice vector and a crystal face 
in each of two crystal structures displayed by the computer. The computer then 
converts data representing the physical layouts of the two crystal structures into 
data representing the physical layout of the crystal structure that would have 
been obtained by combining the original two structures in such a way that the 
two two selected atoms, the two selected lattice vectors and the two selected 
crystal faces  were superimposed. The resulting data were then displayed to give 
an image of the resulting combined structure.
The Patent Court supported the rejection of the application for being directed to 
excluded matter. Pointing out that exclusion from patentability was a matter of 
substance not form, the court emphasised again that it was not enough to just 
frame a claim in terms of what in this paper is called “new-machine approach”, 
in order to obtain patent protection for a computer program. The attention was 
to direct not to the fact that the program was controlling the computer but to 
what the computer, so controlled, was doing. If all that that was being done, as a 
matter  of  substance,  was  the  performance  of  activities  excluded  from 
patentability, no patent may be granted.
Fujitsu's  Application  was  for  a  computer  program  “as  such”  in  the  courts 
177 Merrill Lynch's Application, 1988 R.P.C. 553 [1988]
178 Vicom, EPO Case# T 0208/84 [1986], http://legal.european-patent-
office.org/dg3/biblio/t840208ep1.htm
179 Fujitsu Ltd's Application, 1997 RPC 608; 1997 EWCA Civ 1174 [1996]
46
opinion  and therefore  not  patentable.  If  the  computer  was  creating  the  new 
crystal structure it might be. However the combined structure was not a product 
of the computer but of the operator,  who in fact was aided by the computer. The 
operator was determining the appropriate way of superimposing two of those 
crystals while the computer was merely enabling a faster portrayal of the result. 
Such use of a computer to display things was in their common use, so there was 
neither a novel way of using the computer's hardware.
b. Germany
(1.) Chinesische Schriftzeichen
In  Chinesische Schriftzeichen180 (engl.: Chinese caligraphy) the German BGH 
was concerned with a text processor for Chinese language.
The Chinese “alphabet” comprises about 10,000 different letters, which all even 
can have a plurality of meanings depending on their intonation and additional 
graphical characteristics. It's apparent that the input of Chinese words to a word 
processor by using a keyboard raises problems, i.e. equivocality of an entered 
string and the extensive demand for storage and computing capacity.
The invention describes a text processing system using a plurality of memories. 
The  first  memory  contains  phonetic  and  graphic  characteristics  for  each 
character  and  is  sorted  by  the  frequency  of  the  characters  in  the  Chinese 
language.  The  second  memory contains  words  (successions  of  at  least  two 
characters) in terms of the corresponding memory addresses of the first memory. 
These words are gathered into groups defined by their first character and (again) 
sorted by their frequency in the Chinese language. The third memory contains 
information on the graphical attributes a character is composed of. In a forth 
memory finally all  the information is  gathered to  output  Chinese script  to a 
display or printer. The user enters phonetic and graphic characteristics of the 
demanded  characters  or  words  at  his  keyboard.  Then  an  associative  search 
algorithm retrieves the memory addresses (of the first memory) corresponding 
to these characteristics, determines the intended Chinese word from the sorted 
groups in the second memory and uses this information to retrieve the required 
graphic attributes from the third memory to create the graphic (output) data in 
the forth memory. To understand the actual functioning of the system one needs 
to be skilled in the Chinese language, but it appears that in essence the system 
organises  known  information  about  the  language,  i.e.  phonetic  and  graphic 
characteristics and the frequency of words, to accelerate the process of inputting 
Chinese words to a computer.
The  BGH,  albeit  explicitly  referring  to  the  holding  of  the  EPO  Board  of 
Appeals, argued rather in the ways of its own case law, when it abnegated the 
technical character of the invention. It held that the main aspect of the invention 
was a classification system related to semantic markers in the Chinese language. 
This  was  a  mere  intellectual  exercise.  The  technical  aspects,  i.e.  input  and 
output device and the organisation of the four different memories – in fact these 
180 Chinesische Schriftzeichen, BGHZ 115, 23 [1991]
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can and probably will rather be four different arrays in one an one same physical 
memory – were only of subordinate relevance for the success of the method. 
Therefore they were insufficient to ward a technical character to the invention.
The BGH still assessed the technical character of claim by asking whether the 
'inventive core' is technical.
(2.) Tauchcomputer
However,  shortly after  the  court  set  aside  this  approach and adopted  the so 
called 'technical contribution test' that the EPO Board of Appeals applied that 
time.181
When a scuba diver advances deeper under water the increasing water pressure 
also  causes  the  air  the  diver  breathes  to  gain  more  pressure.  Increasing  air 
pressure causes a dissolution and accumulation of gases in the body tissues and 
blood of the diver. When the diver ascends the opposite happens: the pressure 
decreases and the dissolved substances comes out of solution again. If the diver 
ascends too fast bubbles form in parts of the body. This phenomenon can cause 
sensory failure,  paralysis  and  even death  (so  called  decompression  sickness, 
commonly known as “the bends”). To avoid these unpleasant consequences an 
emerging scuba diver has to halt in certain depths to await decompression.
Prior  to  the  invention  of  the  Tauchcomputer (engl.:  diver  computer)  scuba 
divers used to plan their dives by using (printed) schedules. With the knowledge 
about the depth (taken from a bathometer) and the submerged time (taken from 
a  stopwatch)  the  emerge  time  and  the  required  decompression  halts  were 
apparent from these schedules. The divers computer automated these schedules 
by permanently taking the values from bathometer and stopwatch, recalculating 
the  emerge  time  and  decompression  stops  by  using  a  new  algorithm  and 
displaying the results.
The patent granted by the EPO was declared void by the German Patent Court 
for the reason that the only novel feature resided in the used algorithm, which 
was merely a new mathematical interpretation of the known diver schedules. 
But the BGH reversed that decision holding that the invention was not to dissect 
into technical and non technical parts in order to assess the inventive step with 
respect to the technical parts only. Operating bathometer, chronometer, memory, 
processor and display means due to a certain algorithm was a technical teaching. 
After this conclusion was made the examination for an inventive step had to be 
done irrespectively of what is technical and what is not.182 
Thus the BGH was now adopting the 'technical contribution test' and yet was 
enlaced in some of the inconsistencies. Since the decompression effect in the 
body of a diver using a diver computer does not differ from the decompression 
effect in the body of a diver using the schedules,  the invention of the diver 
computer  necessarily  did  not  reveal  any  new  mathematical  relationship  in 
physics or biology but merely restated the known one. If further the use of a 
181 Tauchcomputer, BGHZ 117, 144 [1992]
182 Tauchcomputer, BGHZ 117, 144 (150) [1992]
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bathometer, chronometer, memory and display device was a technical teaching 
then this teaching was in the prior art: Bathometer and chronometer were used 
ever since to avoid decompression sickness, together with the printed schedules 
which are both, memory and display means. The only really novel feature in the 
invention was the use of a computer. It can very well be that the implementation 
of the computer together with the other devices to a new entity was done in a 
novel and non-obvious way, but the BGH did not assess the Tauchcomputer for 
that kind of authentic invention.
(3.) Logikverifikation
In  1999  the  BGH  also  adopted  the  EPO  Board's  position  of  Sohei that  a 
computer program was not a computer program “as such” in the sense of Art. 52 
EPC (respectively sec. 1 of the German Patents Act) if technical considerations 
are required to  create  the program. Different  to  Sohei the required technical 
considerations were apparent from the court's decision in Logikverifikation.183
The  patented  computer  program was  concerned  with  the  field  of  design  of 
highly integrated circuitry, particularly the logical verification of their physical 
layout. In the course of designing highly integrated circuitry, it is necessary to 
verify whether the physical layout of the circuit diagram, i.e. that what later in 
the actual production process will  be printed onto the silicon chip, forms an 
exact implementation of the logic diagram, i.e. that what it ought to be in terms 
of the intended function of the integrated circuit. This is done by extracting a so 
called hierarchical layout circuit from the physical layout which basically is data 
that  is  descriptive of  the physical  layout.  This  data  is  then compared to  the 
logical  diagram in  order  to  verify  it's  logical  consistency.  Due  to  the  high 
complexity  of  modern  integrated  circuits,  this  process  is  very  time  and 
computing  power  consuming.  The  invented  computer  program,  expressed  in 
extremely simplified terms, reduces the number of connectors to be checked by 
'scanning'  the  hierarchical  layout  for  redundant  data,  i.e.  parts  of  the  circuit 
which are exactly equivalent to other parts, and eliminating these parts from the 
verification process by substituting them with so called macro units.
The BGH found that the claim was directed to a computer program. However 
under  consideration  of  the  whole  subject  of  the  application,  it  was  an 
improvement of the process of silicon chip production.184 It was not directed to a 
mere metal  conception,  but to a technical conception derived from technical 
considerations  which  are  directly  related  to  the  physical  entity  of  highly 
integrated circuits to produce. Only a technical expert with knowledge in the 
field of circuitry and not (only) in the field of informatics and programming was 
able to perform these considerations. This fact warded the technical character to 
the computer program which made it to be not a computer program 'as such' but 
a technical invention, hence patentable.
183 Logikverifikation, BGHZ 143, 255 [1999]
184 Logikverifikation, BGHZ 143, 255 (last page) [1999]
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(4.) Anbieten interaktiver Hilfe
A recent German case was Anbieten interaktiver Hilfe185 (engl.: interactive help 
offering). The applicants stated that market surveys discovered the phenomenon 
that the majority of online customers added items to a „shopping card“186 but did 
not finalize their order. The claimed method is said to be able to determine the 
probability that the customer will cancel an order before dispatching it to the 
system by monitoring the customer's behaviour when browsing the website and 
comparing it with certain reference data. In case this probability was detected 
the  system  offered  an  interactive  help  to  the  customer  to  encourage  the 
completion of the order.
Following approximately the evolution of the EPO Boards of Appeals' opinion 
the BGH now summarized their own one as follows: A computer program was 
never a technical invention just because it made use of computers. In order to 
constitute a technical invention it needed to solve a concrete technical problem 
by technical means. Whereas the term “technical” was still to be defined by the 
direct use of controllable forces of nature to achieve a causal manageable result. 
However if such a problem was solved by the program it was irrelevant that the 
claim was also directed to the use of a mathematical algorithm or an economical 
purpose.
Hence the patent was not allowed because it did not solve a concrete technical 
problem but one that is related to the field of sales psychology. The purpose of 
the invention to gather and transmit information about the customer, i.e. credit 
card information and a legal declaration of intend, had a technical aspect but 
was not part of the problem. It was directed to the customary use of a computers 
and the internet.  The same applied to the possible effect of the invention to 
abate net traffic.
5. Formerly proposed directive
If the gentle reader now misses a clear line in the European adjudication, he or 
she does so justifiably. The holdings are shifting all the time, not only between 
the different jurisdictions but also within them. At the end of the day nobody 
clearly can say what is patentable and what is not. 
The  author  opines  that  in  the  newer  decisions  a  certain  tendency  can  be 
observed towards a  more restrictive allowance of  software patents.  However 
there  is  still  a  lot  of   ambiguousness  and  other  authors  conclude  the  exact 
opposite.187 Among patent  attorneys the question of patentability of software 
under the EPC is still deemed to be mainly a question of drafting skills.188
To overcome the uncertainties  and harmonize  the patent  law in Europe,  the 
European  Commission  (Commission)  and  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  the 
European  Union  (Council)  initiated  the  legislative  procedure  for  a  directive 
185 Anbieten interaktiver Hilfe, BGH GRUR 2005, 141[2004]
186 See above: Amazon v Barnes & Noble (“One Click”)
187 Kraßler, Patentrecht, p. 160
188 Beresford, Patenting Software Under the European Patent Convention, p. 1 - 249
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pursuant to Art. 249 of the Treaty establishing the European Community  (the 
„Rome Treaty“).
Basically  the  first  draft  of  the  directive  codified  the  so  called  'technical 
contribution” test.189 The drafters had to face a very intensive load of criticism 
coming from all over Europe.190  In 2003 the European Parliament presented an 
amended draft featuring fundamental changes.191 The Parliaments version did 
not adopt the 'technical contribution test', but rather the 'inventive step'/'point of 
novelty'  approach.  It  defined  a  “computer  implemented  invention”  as  an 
invention  which  can  be  dissected  to  technical  and  non-technical  features, 
whereas only the technical features may contribute to the inventive step.
The crucial phrases read as follows:
Article 2: Definitions
2a.  “computer-implemented  invention”  means  any  invention  in  the  
sense  of  the  European Patent  Convention  the  performance  of  which  
involves  the  use  of  a  computer,  computer  network  or  other  
programmable  apparatus  and  having  in  its  implementations  one  or  
more non-technical features which are realised wholly or partly by a  
computer  program  or  computer  programs,  besides  the  technical  
features that any invention must contribute;
2b.  “technical  contribution”,  also  called  “invention”,  means  a 
contribution  to  the  state  of  the  art  in  technical  field.  The  technical  
character  of  the  contribution  is  one  of  the  four  requirements  for  
patentability.  Additionally,  to  deserve  a  patent,  the  technical  
contribution has to be new, non-obvious, and susceptible of industrial  
application.
2c. “technical field” means an industrial application domain requiring 
the use of controllable forces of nature to achieve predictable results.  
“Technical” means “belonging to a technical field”. The use of forces  
of nature to control physical effects beyond the digital representation of  
information belongs to a technical domain. The production, handling,  
processing, distribution and presentation of information do not belong 
to a technical field, even when technical devices are employed for such 
purposes.
[...]
Article 3a: Fields of Technology
3a. Member states shall ensure that data processing is not considered to  
189 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the patentability 
of computer-implemented inventions (COM/2002/0092 final - COD 2002/0047) OJ C 151 E 
, 25/06/2002 P. 0129 – 0131 = 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/indprop/comp/com02-92en.pdf
190 Erdos, A Measure to Protect Computer-Implemented Inventions in Europe, The Journal of 
Information, Law and Technology (JILT) 
[http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2004_3/erdos/#a3]
191 Consolidated version of the amended directive “on the patentability of computer-
implementedinventions” for which the European Parliament voted on 2003-09-
24.http://swpat.ffii.org/papers/eubsa-swpat0202/plen0309/resu/plenresu0309.en.pdf
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be a field of technology in the sense of patent law, and that innovations  
in the field of data processing are not considered to be inventions in the 
sense of patent law.
Commission and Council largely refused the amendments of the parliament. In 
2004  they presented  a  version  called  “Political  agreement  on  the  Council’s 
common  position”.192 However  the  Commission  did  not  conceal  that  the 
fundamental  changes  of  the  parliament's  version  had  been  cancelled.  The 
incongruity  of  both  positions  are  apparent  when  comparing  the  texts.  The 
Commission's version reads:
Article 2: Definitions
For the purposes of this Directive the following definitions shall apply:
(a)  “computer-implemented  invention”  means  any  invention  the  
performance of which involves the use of a computer, computer network  
or other programmable apparatus,  the invention having one or more 
features which are realised wholly or partly by means of a computer  
program or computer programs;
(b) “technical contribution” means a contribution to the state of the art  
in a field of technology which is new and not obvious to a person skilled 
in the art. The technical contribution shall be assessed by consideration  
of the difference between the state of the art and the scope of the patent  
claim considered as a whole, which must comprise technical features,  
irrespective of whether or not these are accompanied by non-technical  
features.
Article 3: Computer-implemented inventions as a field of technology
- Deleted -
In the following year the Commission advanced their version in a manner which 
must be marked as questionable in terms of democratic principles. This paper 
abstains from a portrayal. Ultimately the bill was rejected by the EU-Parliament 
with the vast majority of 648 out of 680 votes.193
192 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the patentability 
of computer-implemented inventions - Political agreement on the Council’s common position 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st09/st09713.en04.pdf
193 Sherriff, EU Parliament bins software patent bill, “The Register” 6th July 2005 , 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/07/06/eu_bins_swpat/
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D. Softwarepatents and the TRIPS-
Agreement
The  Agreement  on  Trade-Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  Rights 
(TRIPS) is the most important attempt for substantial harmonization of patent 
law on a global level. Art. 27 TRIPS provides that patents shall be available for 
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology. It has 
been  argued  that  this  provision  did  not  allow  to  exclude  software  from 
patentability since they belonged to a field of technology.194
However  this  argument is  based  on  a  circular  reasoning.  The  very question 
which  is  answered  discordant  is  whether  software  belongs  to  a  field  of 
technology or rather to the field of mathematics and whether software can be an 
invention in  the sense of  patent  law.  TRIPS did  not  intend to  answer these 
questions and left it to the memberstates to do so.195
Opposers of software patents also argue with TRIPS. Art. 10 of the agreement 
states that Computer programs shall  be protected as literary works under the 
Berne Convention (1971), hence under copyright law. This inclusion of software 
to the scope of copyright had to be construed as an exclusion from patent law. 
This argument is supplemented with a further reference to Art. 13 TRIPS which 
requires memberstates to confine limitations  and exceptions to copyrights  to 
certain special  cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights 
holder.
In fact the clash of copyright and patent law already caused issues. However Art 
10, 13 TRIPS can not be  construed as  to exclude software from patentability. 
Copyright and patents are not necessarily incompatible. While copyright can be 
used as protection for software, software patents can be used as protection for an 
invention  that  is  implemented  by means  of  software.  The  question  remains: 
When is software creating an effect that constitutes an invention in the sense of 
patent law?
The TRIPS agreement itself does not answer this question but requires a given 
answer to it. The logically derived  truth is: TRIPS is useless for finding the 
answer.
194 Schiuma, TRIPS and Exclusion of Software "as such" from Patentability, IIC 31, p. 36; 
Rahamim, Internet and e-commerce patents (Cyberlaw @ SA II), p. 75




Patent law served very well during the age of industrialisation. It advanced the 
development of new machines and improved industrial processes; it was a very 
well established principle that the scope of patent law was limited to the 'world 
phenomena'; this could be utilized in industrial processes, whereas the 'world of 
mind' was not susceptible of patent law, but free. In most continental European 
countries this distinction was expressed as the 'technical effect requirement' of a 
patent.196 This  term does  not  occur in the historic  case law of  common law 
countries, but it's meaning was a global common understanding of patent law. In 
the U.S.A. the very same notion was expressed when courts reasoned that a 
scientific concept or mere idea could not be the subject of a valid patent.197 It 
was the same principle with another name: “the mental step doctrine”198 The 
borderline was relatively easy to identify: Patentable inventions required some 
physical improvement, may it be a new machine or a new method to process 
physical objects. Unpatentable inventions in intellectual fields such as literature, 
mathematics  or  basic  scientific  principles  usually  were  abstract  of  a  certain 
physical structure and could be performed entirely by the human mind. Virtually 
all technical inventions involved mathematical considerations and were based 
on some kind of mathematical principle but a patent always was granted for the 
application of these mathematical principles to the physical environment, not for 
the mathematics as such.
With the invention of computers, this borderline started to blur. Computers are 
machines,  physical  entities,  that  perform  mathematics.  Something  that 
beforehand could clearly be classified as belonging to the 'world of mind' now 
entered the 'world of phenomena'. A grey area had emerged. 
First of all it must be thoroughly considered what a computer does in order to 
find the borderline in this grey area . In principle the answer is fairly easy: A 
computer computes.  More precisely it  performs mathematics and in fact  any 
kind  of  mathematics.  This  means  that  a  computer  is  not  only an  ingenious 
invention but it also means that this ingenious invention always forms part of 
the  prior  art.  Hence  performing a  'new'  algorithm on a  computer  can  never 
constitute a new way of using that computer, because the original purpose of the 
computer  is  to  perform  any conceivable  algorithm.  We cannot  truncate  this 
ingenious invention just because we may find that it is too ingenious and want 
to issue some more patents on it. 
The critics of this understanding claim that it  rendered an otherwise patentable 
invention  unpatentable  simply  because  a  computer  was  involved199 But  this 
196 e.g. in Multiplikationatabelle, RG GRUR 1933, 289 (290) [1933]
197 Gottschalk v Benson, 409 U.S. 63 [1972]
198 so in prior cases, e.g. In re Heritage, 150 F.2d 554, 556-558, 66 USPQ 217, 219-221 [1945]; 
In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380-383, 89 USPQ 324, 326-330 [1951]
199 e.g. in reason 3 of EPO Case# T 0026/86 [1987]
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criticism  is unsubstantiated because the according rule of thumb does not say 
“An invention is not subject of patent law if the computerized calculation part in 
it could also be carried out by the human brain”. Of course that is not right since 
the work of a computer theoretically always can be substituted by a human. The 
right rule of thumb is:
“A software invention is not subject of patent law if that what remains when the 
computerized  calculation  part  is  replaced  by  a  human  does  not  contain  a 
teaching to utilise controllable forces of nature to achieve a causal manageable 
result”
These perceptions applied consequently rebut the 'new machine approach'.  A 
least  it  is  not  thinkable  that  the  'new machine  approach'  can  ever  render  a 
computer  program patentable  which is  not  patentable  due to  the fact  that  it 
merely performs mathematics,  e.g.  in  the cases  In Re Allapat200 or Vicom201. 
Even given that a computer becomes a 'different machine' when programmed in 
a certain way, it  never may become a new or non-obvious machine unless it 
does something which goes beyond pure mathematics.
That  something must  be the very invention,  it  must  be the new teaching to 
utilise controllable forces [...]. And further if the software is part of the patent 
claim then the software must contain this teaching. In other words for a person 
skilled in the art the teaching must be derivable from the software. The court in 
the exemplary Vicom case, erred to identify such a teaching in a claim directing 
a filtering algorithm to the specific end use of image processing. The digitalized 
image was not a direct representative of the original physical image; it contained 
the same information as its original but remained data, abstract of the original. 
From the today's point of view this abstractness is easier to comprehend because 
commonly  known  digital  cameras  create  a  digital  image  without  any 
corresponding physical original at all (Except for the motive). The filtering of 
the  digital  image data  did  not  cause  a  direct  physical  effect.  In  the  overall 
process of scanning, processing and printing out the image, the software did not 
teach a new way of transforming matter because it was concerned with the part 
of  mathematically  filtering  only,  which  was  abstract  from possible  physical 
transformation  acts  (scanning  and  printing).  Except  for  this  scanning  and 
printing (which was in the prior art) there was no act of physical transformation. 
The algorithm would have been patentable if it e.g. taught a technically novel 
way of printing but the filtering did not cause the printer to be used in a novel 
way.  The  printer  already  was  set  to  print  any  data,  including  data  that  is 
processed  with  Vicom's  algorithm.  The  counter-example  is 
Antiblockiersystem202. In this case the software contained an authentic invention. 
Sure the processing unit  merely computed data as well and the electronically 
controlled valves already were set to work in accordance to any rule, including 
the invented one.  But  when working in accordance to the latter  there was a 
physical effect of antilockbraking. A person skilled in the art could derive this 
very effect directly from algorithm in the computer program, hence the program 
itself was containing the inventive and patentable teaching. In Vicom there was 
200 In Re Alappat, 33 F3.d 1526; 31 USPQ2D 1545 [1994]
201 Vicom, EPO Case# T 0208/84 [1986]
202 Antiblockiersystem, BGH GRUR 1980, 849 [1980]
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no physical effect derivable from the algorithm. The product was filtered data. 
In fact it might be physically printed out, but it also might be physically stored 
to  a  magnetic  disk  or  physically  light  exposed  to  a  photographic  paper 
whatsoever. Pivotal is that none of these physical acts can be derived from the 
algorithm.
The approach of assessing the invention “as a whole” opens a gate to claim 
patents on pure mathematics by merely directing it to some kind of physical post 
solution activity abstract from the algorithm. So an analysis of the invention into 
technical  and  non-technical  features  and  the  establishment  that  the  technical 
features  must  be  derivable  from  the  program  algorithm  are  necessary 
requirements in order to achieve the right result.
The EPO Board of Appeals recently took a step in the right direction by setting 
aside  their  'technical  contribution  test'  and  adopting  the  'inventive  step' 
approach. However so far it has only been applied to business method patents; it 
has to be awaited whether  they will  consequently apply it  to other  software 
patents as well.
II. The change
So why is the U.S. case law so far away from this? The answer is that the CCPA 
and the Federal Circuit  made substantial  changes to the patent law. They set 
aside  well  established  principles  such  as  the  'mental  step  doctrine',203 the 
'business  method  exception',204 and  -  as  this  paper  pointed  out  –  with  the 
reasoning In Re Alappat205 even the 'mathematical method exception'.
These changes are substantial because they effect broad areas of society. There 
is an ongoing controversial  discussion amongst experts in law and computer 
sciences on the issue of software and business method patents. A recent research 
paper  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Philadelphia  identified  a  large-scale 
(negative) impact of these changes of law on the U.S. economy.206 Particularly 
small and medium enterprises fear extinction through Softwarepatents.
Patent law is a matter of policy. Changes to the policy, in a democratic society, 
should be done in  the general  assembly, where the related questions  can be 
publicly debated giving all relevant people the opportunity to contribute. In a 
court trial there are usually two parties attending their own interests only. It is 
not the right place to change a legal policy effecting an entire nation. Therefore 
only a parliament is mandated to undertake such a change. This was pointed out 
by U.S.  Supreme Court  two times  in  the  'Trilogy'.207 Apparently CCPA and 
Federal Circuit preferred to read over these passages in the decisions.
The fact that the proposed 'Software Patents Directive' in the E.U. failed to pass 
203 In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378, modified on rehearing 415 F.2d 1393 [1969]
204 State Street v Signature, 149 F.3d 1368 [1996]
205 In Re Alappat, 33 F3.d 1526; 31 USPQ2D 1545 [1994]
206 Bessen/ Hunt, An Empirical Look At Software Patents, Research on Innovation, Working 
Paper No 013-17/R
207 Gottschalk v Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (@73) [1972] and Parker v Flook 437 U.S. 584 (@595) 
[1978]
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the parliament does not mean that the parliament was too inert or incompetent to 
decide  on  the  issue.  If  the  drafters  of  a  bill  aspire  a  positive  vote  in  the 
parliament  then they ought to pay some attention to  the parliaments opinion 
when drafting the bill. That is the very object of a parliamentary democracy.
There is  another rather pragmatic argument for a decision in the parliament. 
While a court may only extend a given statutory legal system such as the patent 
law to software inventions, the parliament has the opportunity to create a new 
one which might be more appropriate to the matter. Indeed there are arguments 
in our present 'information-age' that support the need for an intellectual property 
right in software and online business methods which goes beyond copyright. But 
a rigid expansion of the patent law does not give consideration to the facts of 
software engineering which are different to those of technical engineering. One 
example is the dimension of time. Software developments are much more fast 
moving.  Granting  a  monopoly  on  a  method  for  a  period  of  20  years  is 
inappropriate in software engineering. A new intellectual property right to be 
created might feature a shorter duration.
The “Green  Paper  on Electronic  Commerce  in  South  Africa”  identified that 
there  is  a  need  to  implement  a  global  integrated  mechanism  for  the 
administration and issuing of patents to synchronise the growth, globally, of the 
knowledge  based  society.208 However  there  is  no  need  to  copy improvident 
concepts  from other  countries;  particularly not  if  they were  created  without 
participation of their parliaments. In the E.U. it appears that the practise of past 
decades is not quite congruent with the majority opinion in the parliaments. The 
Indian Parliament recently refrained from expanding patent law to software. The 
U.S. Congress has never been asked.
III. Conclusion
Widening the scope of definition and the criterion in rendering a patent beyond 
the strict requirement of a technical contribution in the inventive step constitutes 
a substantial change of law. In the Republic of South Africa such a change of 
law should exclusively be made by the South African parliament, thoroughly 
paying attention to the concerns of all affected parts of society. 
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